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INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 1996, California State Senator Byron
Sher held a hearing on the status of the Davis-Stirling Com-
mon Interest Development Act1 ("Davis-Stirling" or "the Act")
and community association law.2 At the hearing, a variety of
opinions were expressed. Two consistent themes emerged.
Many who testified expressed the opinion that the law was
* Katharine N. Rosenberry is a professor at California Western School of
Law, a member of the American Law Institute and its Consultative Group of
the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes), a member of the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers and the College of Community Association
Lawyers.
** Curtis G. Sproul is a partner in the firm of Weintraub, Genshlea &
Sproul, where he specializes in community association law. He is the former
chair of the State Bar Committee on Nonprofit Corporations and Unincorpo-
rated Associations and the Real Property Section, Subcommittee on Common
Interest Developments. The authors wish to thank Gurdon H. Buck, Carl Lis-
man, Mary Howell, and John Hecht for their thoughtful comments on this arti-
cle and Julia Cline for her research assistance.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350-1376 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
2. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
AFTER "NAHRSTEDT": THE SUMMARY REPORT FROM THE INTERIM HEARING OF
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND LAND USE (Nov. 12, 1996)
[hereinafter HEARING].
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too confusing. Furthermore, it was noted that the problem
was aggravated by the fact that the legislature has con-
stantly changed the law.3
The opinion that the law is confusing is supported by the
fact that the legislature has amended Davis-Stirling Act
thirty-nine times since 1987, even though it only contains
twenty-seven sections.4 By comparison, during the same pe-
riod, the legislature amended the California version of the
Uniform Commercial Code only twelve times even though it
contains 11,004 sections.' The fact that Davis-Stirling is con-
fusing and constantly changing, has led some to believe that
the California legislature should consider adopting the Uni-
form Common Interest Ownership Act,6 ("UCIOA"), or, at
least, portions of it. Certainty and predictably, which does
not presently exist in the community association field, are
necessary so that associations are not forced to incur the ex-
pense of employing lawyers to attend every association
meeting.7
Before one can decide, whether to advocate adoption of
UCIOA, in whole or in part, it is necessary to know more
about the Act. The purpose of this article is to give a brief
history of UCIOA, to compare it to California law and to en-
courage further discussion of a comprehensive revision of
Davis-Stirling. It is impossible to provide an in depth discus-
sion of all relevant portions of UCIOA or California law
within the confines of this article.8 Nevertheless, this article
will discuss many of the major similarities and differences
between the acts.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Between 1977 and 1981, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uni-
3. HEARING, supra note 2.
4. CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1350-1376 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
5. CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1101-15104 (West 1964 & Supp. 1998).
6. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-110 (1994), 7 pt.
1 U.L.A., 471-650 (1997).
7. See HEARING, supra note 2, at 6-7 (testimony of Mary Howell).
8. See e.g., JEFFREY G. WAGNER ET AL., CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM AND
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE (Continuing Educ. of the Bar eds., 1984 &
Supp. 1997); CURTIS SPROUL & KATHARINE ROSENBERRY, ADVISING CALIFORNIA
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS (Continuing Educ. of the Bar
eds., 1991 & Supp. 1998), for a fuller discussion of the California law in this
field.
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form Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community
Act and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act.9 The Uni-
form Condominium Act, or parts of it, has been adopted by
eighteen states.'" The Uniform Planned Community Act has
been adopted by Oregon and Pennsylvania;" and the Model
Real Estate Cooperative Act, or parts of it, has been adopted
in Virginia and Pennsylvania. 2
Because each of these acts dealt with shared ownership
or common interest communities, the national commissioners
decided that they should be combined into a single act, deal-
ing with all the forms of common interest ownership. 3
Therefore, in 1982 the Uniform Law Commissioners consoli-
dated the various acts into the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act. 4
Numerous organizations participated in the preparation
of these various acts, including: the National Association of
Home Builders, the Veterans Administration, the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America, the Resort Timesharing
Council, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, the American Bar Association, American Land Title
Association, American Insurance Association, Community
Associations Institute, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration, American Bankers Association, National Association
of Realtors, American Land Development Association, the
Urban Land Institute, and the National Association of
Housing Cooperatives." Consequently, the Acts, including
UCIOA, are the product of a compromise of competing
views."
9. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT, Prefatory Note (1994), 7 pt.
1 U.L.A. 472 (1997).
10. Id. New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maine, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Washington, D.C., Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, and Wiscon-
sin. Uniform Law Commission, Fact Sheet: A Few Facts About the Uniform
Acts (Apr. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (on file with author).





16. For additional information on these Uniform Acts and UCIOA, see
Norman Geis, Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Common-Interest Own-
ership Act, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1982); Carl H. Lisman, Evolu-
tion In The Law: Amendments to the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,
in DRAFTING DOCUMENTS FOR CONDOMINIUMS PUD'S & GOLF COURSE
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I. OVERVIEW
A. Philosophy
Two of the purposes of UCIOA are to simplify the law of
common interest communities and to promote the flow of
funds to common interest communities between states.
1 7
Thus, the Act provides that it shall be construed to effectuate
a uniform law among the states. 8
UCIOA also permits flexibility in the creation of common
interest communities; to that end, it provides default provi-
sions. If the declarant (usually a corporation) wishes to pro-
vide alternate provisions, it may do so. 9 For example, a dec-
laration can determine whether the interest in a cooperative
is real or personal property.0 It may also prohibit the reallo-
cation of limited common elements that otherwise would be
permitted.21 Thirty-seven provisions of UCIOA can be altered
by the declarant."
Although many of its provisions may be altered by the
declarant, UCIOA provides two safeguards for consumers.
First, some sections of UCIOA do not permit the declarant to
alter them. For example, many of the consumer protection
provisions can not be altered. Second, a declarant cannot use
any device, such as obtaining a power of attorney from the
owners, to evade the limitations or prohibitions of the Act."
In many jurisdictions, developers obtain powers of attorney
from the owners permitting the developer to unilaterally ex-
ercise rights that require 100% approval of the owners. 4
UCIOA prohibits such practices."
COMMUNITIES, C924 ALI-ABA 379 (May 5, 1994).
17. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-110 cmt. (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 500 (1997).
18. To date six states have adopted the Act and five more introduced ver-
sions of UCIOA in their legislatures in 1997. Fact Sheet, supra note 10. States
that have adopted UCIOA are: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnesota, Ne-
vada and West Virginia. States that introduced the act in the 1997 legislature
are: Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Vermont and West Virginia. Id.
19. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-104 cmt. 1 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 490 (1997); see id. cmt. 4 for sections that can be altered in the declara-
tion.
20. Id. § 1-105(a), at 492.
21. Id. § 2-108, at 532.
22. Id. §§ 1-101 to 5-110, at 471-650.
23. Id. § 1-104, at 489-92.
24. See id. cmt. 3, at 490.
25. Id.
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The philosophy of Davis-Stirling is similar to that of
UCIOA. It contains default provisions and provides con-
sumer protection provisions that may not be altered by the
declaration. The main difference, however, is that Davis-
Stirling does not permit as many provisions to be altered. 6
Moreover, each year more provisions are amended or added
that reduce flexibility. These provisions are discussed
throughout the article.
Another important difference between the two Acts is
their approach to commercial and industrial common interest
developments. While Davis-Stirling exempts commercial and
industrial common interest developments from some of its
sections, 7 UCIOA permits declarants of these developments
to exempt the community from the entire Act. 8 These ex-
emptions are discussed below. Consequently, UCIOA per-
mits greater flexibility than does California law.
B. Application of Acts
It is important to note that UCIOA does not apply to all
common interest communities, as does Davis-Stirling.
UCIOA does not apply to some communities that existed on
the date of its adoption. It also exempts some communities
that are created even after adoption.
UCIOA uses a three-pronged approach to the problem of
retroactivity. First, subject to some exceptions, discussed
below, UCIOA applies to all common interest communities
created after the Act becomes law. 9 Second, certain sections
of the Act apply to all pre-existing communities, but only
prospectively in a manner that does not invalidate provisions
of the governing documents (as construed under the law in
existence at the time UCIOA is adopted)." Examples of such
provisions include: those relating to eminent domain, the de-
26. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1350-1376 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
27. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1373 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
28. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-207(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 513-14 (1997). UCIOA also provides flexibility through the concept of
development rights. For example, subject to restrictions provided in the act,
the size and density of a project may be increased, the mix of units, common
elements and limited common elements can be changed and the project can be
reduced in size. See id. § 1-103(14) cmt. 15, at 486-87.
29. Id. § 1-201, at 505.
30. Id. § 1-204, at 508-09.
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scription of the units, and merger and consolidation." Third,
owners may amend the declaration and bylaws existing prior
to the effective date of the act, even if the amendment would
not have been permitted by previous law, so long as (1) the
owners adopt the amendment consistent with procedures re-
quired by the previous law, and (2) the substance of the
amendment does not violate UCIOA.
To illustrate this three-pronged approach, assume
UCIOA becomes effective in California on January 1, 1999.
With some exceptions, discussed below, the Act would apply
to all common interest communities created on, or after,
January 1, 1999. In addition, certain provisions would apply
to all common interest communities, regardless of when the
community was created, but only prospectively, and only if
the provisions are consistent with the governing documents.
Thus, if a city began condemnation proceedings after January
1, 1999, the eminent domain provision section 1-107 of
UCIOA, would apply even to communities created prior to
January 1, 1999, provided the provision was not inconsistent
with the declaration or bylaws of the community. 2
Finally, amendments to any declaration or bylaws occur-
ring after January 1, 1999, could incorporate provisions of
UCIOA, even if previous law would have prohibited the
amendment. The procedures for adopting the amendment,
however, must be consistent with the declaration and bylaws.
For example, if the owners wished to amend the declaration
to permit alteration of units in a manner prohibited by previ-
ous law, they could do so if they satisfied the procedures pre-
viously required for amending the documents. Thus, if the
31. Additional provisions of UCIOA that apply to existing common interest
communities include section 1-205 (providing exceptions for small pre-existing
cooperatives and planned communities), section 1-105 (relating to the separate
taxation of units), section 1-106 (pertaining to local ordinances and state law
requirements), section 2-103 (pertaining to the construction of declarations and
bylaws), sections 3-102(a)(1) through (6) and (11) through (16) (pertaining to
the powers of the association), section 3-111 (relating to tort and contract li-
ability), section 3-116 (relating to assessment liens), section 3-118 (pertaining to
association records) section 4-109 (pertaining to resale of units), and section 4-
117 (pertaining to attorney fees.) UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §§
1-105, 1-106, 1-205, 2-103, 3-102, 3-111, 3-116, 4-109, 4-117 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 492 et seq. (1997). In addition, section 1-103 provides that the defini-
tions apply to the extent necessary in construing any of the sections of the act,
but only to events occurring after enactment and to the extent the definitions
do not invalidate the pre-existing governing documents. Id. § 1-204, at 509.
32. Id. § 1-107, at 497.
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declaration provided that amendments were valid only upon
approval of owners holding 75% of the votes in the associa-
tion, 75% would have to approve the amendment, not the
lower percentage permitted by UCIOA.33
When the legislature enacted Davis-Stirling, it intended
to apply the Act to both new and existing common interest
developments. To make its intention clear, Assemblyman
Stirling introduced urgency legislation in 1986 which became
effective immediately upon passage.34  This legislation
amended section 1352 of the California Civil Code to provide
that Davis-Stirling applies "whenever a separate interest
coupled with an interest in the common area or membership
in the association is, or has been, conveyed provided" certain
documents are recorded.35
Even before the legislature enacted Davis-Stirling,
amendments to California condominium law applied to de-
velopments in existence on the date the statute was
amended. In other words, the new law applied retroactively.
For example, the provisions of the Condominium Act, per-
taining to assessments36 applied to all condominiums on the
date of the statute's enactment. Because the legislature has
applied Davis-Stirling and its amendments retroactively37 to
existing developments, it is likely that the legislature will
apply future changes in the law of common interest develop-
ments to existing developments. Although one must consider
potential constitutional challenges when applying amend-
ments to existing developments,38 it would confuse the public
to have different laws applicable to different common interest
developments.
33. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 546 (1997).
34. Act of Feb. 25, 1986, c. 9, 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. 32 (West) (codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1352).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1352 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
Because section 1352 provides that a common interest development is not cre-
ated unless the declaration, final or parcel map and condominium plan if one
exists are recorded an interesting question arises. What happens if the project
is clearly a common interest development but the declarant forgets to record
one of the required documents such as the condominium plan?
36. Former CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350-1370 (repealed by stats. 1985 c. 874
§ 13).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1352 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
38. See Katharine Rosenberry, You Can't Raise Assessments. I Have A Con-
tract! The Legislature & Impairment of Contract, 8 CAL. REAL. PROP. J. 1, 16
(1990).
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As mentioned, UCIOA, unlike California law, exempts
some developments from the Act. For example, common in-
terest communities that contain no residences are exempt.
39
Also, common interest communities that are exclusively
commercial or industrial are not subject to the Act unless the
declaration provides otherwise. °
The declaration may provide either that the entire Act
applies or that only the provisions on separate taxation, ap-
plicability of local ordinances, and eminent domain apply.4 If
the declaration applies the entire Act, then it can also require
the continuation of certain contracts and leases after turn-
over of control, even though these contracts otherwise would
be subject to cancellation."' Further, the declaration may
contain provisions permitting the declarant to use proxies to
obtain results that could not be accomplished under the Act.'"
In contrast, Davis-Stirling provides only a limited ex-
emption for commercial and industrial common interest de-
velopments. Section 1373 of the California Civil Code pro-
vides that section 1356 (pertaining to court ordered
amendments), section 1365 (relating to financial disclosures),
sections 1366.1 and 1363 (relating to assessments), and sec-
tion 1363 (relating to budget preparation) are not applicable
to commercial and industrial common interest develop-
ments."" The remaining provisions of Davis-Stirling are ap-
plicable to these developments.
The only reason Davis-Stirling applied to all common in-
terest developments was to make California law consistent
with the version of UCIOA in existence at the time. In 1994,
UCIOA was amended to permit developers to exempt com-
mercial and industrial developments from the entire Act.'9
Thus, it seems logical to amend Davis-Stirling to give com-
mercial and industrial developers the same rights to exempt
such communities.
39. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (1994).
40. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-207(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 513 (1997).
41. Id. § 1-207(c), at 513.
42. Id. § 1-207(d)(1), at 513.
43. Id. § 1-207(d)(2), at 513. Note, however, the declaration may only in-
clude these provisions if they are not unconscionable. Id. § 1-207(d).
44. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1373 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
45. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-207 cmt. 1 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 514 (1997).
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Further, the legislature has amended Davis-Stirling
since 1988, without also amending section 1373 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code. Also, commercial and industrial develop-
ments are not exempt from subsequently enacted provi-
sions."' They should be. The consumer protection provisions
in Davis-Stirling were not drafted for commercial and indus-
trial developments.
Another distinction between the Acts is that UCIOA, un-
like Davis-Stirling, ' does not require some small communi-
ties to be governed by all of the provisions of the Act. For ex-
ample, under UCIOA, cooperatives containing twelve or
fewer units (separate interests) and no development rights
are subject only to the provisions regarding eminent domain
and the prohibition on governments treating identical struc-
tures differently. ' If the declarant chooses, it may provide in
the declaration that the entire Act applies. 9 If the declarant
chooses to incorporate some, but not all, of the provisions of
UCIOA it may do so.' ° UCIOA provides that those provisions
are to be governed by contract law, not Davis-Stirling.51
A similar exception is provided for planned communities
that have fewer than twelve units and an annual common
expense liability for residential units (exclusive of optional
fees and insurance premiums) of $300, measured in 1979
dollars (now about $500).52 Such communities are only sub-
ject to the provisions dealing with taxation," eminent do-
main54 and state and local government discrimination based
46. For example, they are not exempt from section 1375 of the California
Civil Code relating to the filing of construction defect lawsuits. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1375 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
47. Although Davis-Stirling does not provide exemptions for small commu-
nities, the Subdivided Lands Act (which controls the initial sale of separate in-
terests) does not apply to residential developments of four separate interests or
less. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §11000.1(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
48. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-202 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
506 (1997). UCIOA, however, applies to all condominiums. Id. § 1-202, at 505.
49. Id.
50. Id. cmt. 2.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1-203, at 507-08. UCIOA provides a formula for increasing this
amount over time. See id. § 1-115, at 503. Also, comments to UCIOA § 1-203
clearly provide that a declarant cannot low ball, or create artificially low as-
sessments, merely to be exempt from the Act. Id. § 1-203 cmt. 2(a)-(b), at 507-
08.
53. Id. § 1-105, at 492.
54. Id. § 1-107, at 497.
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on the form of ownership.55 An exemption also exists for
communities created before the effective date of UCIOA.56 In
order to qualify for exemption, the pre-existing cooperative or
planned community must contain no more than twelve units
and must not be subject to any development rights.57 Finally,
the Act exempts mixed-use projects, unless the residential
units satisfy the definition of "common interest community"
in section 1-103(7). 58
The task force members who assisted in the drafting of
Davis-Stirling were aware of the exemptions for small devel-
opments that existed in UCIOA. They considered proposing
similar exemptions in Davis-Stirling. There was not suffi-
cient time to work out the details, however, so these exemp-
tions were not proposed.59 Since 1985, several people have
proposed exempting smaller developments. Section 1375 of
the California Civil Code, which became effective in 1996,
does exempt developments with fewer than twenty units. °
The legislature should consider adopting the exemptions pro-
vided in UCIOA, with one exception.
There are no exceptions for small condominium projects
55. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-106 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
495 (1997).
56. Id. § 1-205, at 510.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 1-103(7), at 479. Section 1-103(7) provides that:
"Common interest community" means real estate with respect to which
a person, by virtue of his ownership of a unit, is obligated to pay for
real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance, or improvement
of other real estate described in a declaration. "Ownership of a unit"
does not include holding a leasehold interest of less than [20] years in a
unit, including renewal options.
Id.
Some of the public offering provisions of UCIOA, also, do not apply to out of
state communities that are sold in state. Id. § 1-208, at 515. However, section
1-208 provides that sections 4-102 through 4-108 apply to contracts signed in
the state adopting UCIOA unless exempt under section 4-101(b). UNIF.
COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-208 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 515 (1997).
59. Katharine Rosenberry was Senior Consultant to the California Select
Assembly Committee on Common Interest Developments. In that capacity she
was responsible for chairing two task forces that proposed provisions for Davis-
Stirling and corresponding with all individuals that commented on the pro-
posed Act, was the principle drafter of the Act, and attended all the committee
meetings and the hearings of the Assembly and Senate pertaining to Davis-
Stirling. Curtis Sproul was a member of one of the task forces and participated
in drafting portions of the Act and was a member of a task force created by the
Sate Bar of California to assist in drafting the 1980 amendments to the Non-
profit Corporation Code.
60. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1375(d), 1375(h)(4)(i) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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in UCIOA. The reasons for the distinction are historical and
are not based on differences between the communities.6
Therefore, if California adopts the concept of exempting small
developments from the provisions of Davis-Stirling, it should
treat all common interest developments similarly, as it cur-
rently does.
C. Rules for Construction of Statute
UCIOA contains a provision similar to section 1-104 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. It provides that UCIOA is a
general act intended for unified coverage, and that no part of
it shall be construed to be void if such construction can be
avoided.62 There is no similar provision in Davis-Stirling, but
the legislature should not be opposed to adopting such a pro-
vision because it is consistent with the original purpose of the
Davis-Stirling Act.
Other provisions in UCIOA, relating to statutory con-
struction, include section 1-111 (which provides that the pro-
visions of the Act are severable), 3 section 1-112 (which pro-
vide that the court can refuse to enforce a contract if it finds
the contract unconscionable),6 4 and section 1-113 (which im-
plies in every contract an obligation of good faith in its per-
formance or enforcement)." "Good faith" is defined in the
Comments to section 1-113 as "'honesty in fact' and obser-
vance of reasonable standards of fair dealing."66 Sections 1-
112 and 1-113 are patterned after similar provisions in the
Uniform Commercial Code.67 These provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code have been adopted in the California Com-
mercial Code.68
If these sections are considered for adoption by Davis-
61. Telephone interview with Carl H. Lisman, Chair of the Standby Com-
mittee, Common Interest Ownership Act (1994), the Committee that prepared
UCIOA (1994) for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (Sept. 21, 1997). Historically planned communities and cooperatives were
created by the governing documents while condominiums were created by stat-
ute.
62. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-109 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
500 (1997).
63. Id. § 1-111, at 501.
64. Id. § 1-112, at 501.
65. Id. § 1-113, at 502.
66. Id.
67. U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 1-201 (1998).
68. CAL. COM. CODE § 1203 (West 1964 & Supp. 1998).
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Stirling, section 1-113 should be clarified. The provision was
presumably intended to apply only to the contracts to which
the association is a party, and not to the declaration; but the
section does not make this clear.69
Section 2-103 of UCIOA is similar in purpose to section
1370 of Davis-Stirling. UCIOA provides that all provisions of
the declaration and bylaws are severable7" which encourages
liberal construction; Davis-Stirling provides that the gov-
erning documents will be liberally construed. Both sections
also provide that the Rule Against Perpetuities does not ap-
ply to invalidate provisions of the governing documents; how-
ever, UCIOA's provision is slightly more restrictive.71
UCIOA, unlike Davis-Stirling, specifically provides that if
there is a conflict between the declaration and bylaws, the
declaration controls. Although it is assumed by association
practitioners in California that the declaration controls, it
would be beneficial for a statute to so provide.
II. TERMINOLOGY
A. Similar Definitions: Association
Some of the definitions and terms used in UCIOA, such
as the definition of "association," are similar to those used in
Davis-Stirling. Under both Davis-Stirling and UCIOA, the
owners are members of the association, and the association is
responsible for governing the community.72 A potential dif-
ference, however, is that under UCIOA, the association must
consist exclusively of owners.73 In some California common
interest developments the association also consists of
"associate members" who are not owners.74 This topic is dis-
69. Good faith is only one aspect of the duty the directors and officers owe
under the declaration. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103
(1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 575-77 (1997).
70. Id. § 2-103(a), at 520.
71. Id. § 2-103(b), at 520.
72. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1351(a), 1363 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); UNIF.
COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(3) (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 479 (1997);
Id. § 3-101, at 571-72.
73. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-101.
74. For example, within the boundaries of some California common interest
developments there are golf courses operated as private clubs (rather than be-
ing association common facilities). Members of the club may be given rights in
the Declaration to become non-voting associate members of the association with
rights to use certain recreation facilities, such as a swimming pool or tennis
1020 [Vol. 38
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cussed below.75
Another significant difference between Davis-Stirling
and UCIOA, is that under UCIOA, the association can be in-
corporated as either a for-profit or nonprofit corporation."
While Davis-Stirling does not specifically state that the asso-
ciation must be incorporated as a mutual benefit nonprofit
corporation, it implies as much. Again, this topic is discussed
below.77
B. Similar Definitions but Different Terms: Common Interest
Community, Common Elements, Limited Common
Elements and Unit
Other definitions in the two acts are very similar, but the
terms used to describe them are slightly different. For ex-
ample, "common interest community"7" is UCIOA term for
acommon interest development," "common elements"79 is the
term for "common area," "limited common elements"" is the
term for "exclusive use common area," and "unit"" is the term
for "separate interest." " Thus, under UCIOA, a "lot" is a
"unit." In the discussion that follows, when a UCIOA term is
used, which is different from the corresponding term in
Davis-Stirling, the Davis-Stirling term will be placed in pa-
renthesis.
C. Similar Terms But Different Definitions: Types of
Common Interest Developments
Finally, some terms in the two Acts are similar, but their
definitions are different. The most significant differences be-
tween definitions in the two Acts relate to the definitions of
the various common interest communities (developments).
Both Acts specifically identify planned communities
(developments), condominiums, and cooperatives as common
courts.
75. See discussion supra Part V.A.1.
76. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-101 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
571-72 (1997).
77. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
78. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(7) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 479 (1997).
79. Id. § 1-103(4), at 479.
80. Id. § 1-103(19), at 480.
81. Id. § 1-103(31), at 482.
82. The authors find the use of the term "unit" to apply to both "unit" and
"lot" unnecessarily confusing.
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interest communities (developments)." However, the defini-
tions of "condominium" and "planned community" in the two
Acts are different. UCIOA and Davis-Stirling both provide
that in a condominium, an owner has a tenancy in common
interest in the common area, coupled with a separate interest
in a unit.84 Both acts also permit the association to own
property in its own name. UCIOA specifically provides that
the association may own property that is not part of the
common scheme and is not subject to the Act.85 Davis-
Stirling, on the other hand, does not state whether or not the
association may own common area that is not subject to the
provisions of Davis-Stirling.
Depending on the circumstances, there may be advan-
tages to an association owning property that is not subject to
the Act. For example, assume an association takes title to a
unit through a foreclosure sale when its lien for delinquent
assessments is foreclosed. Under UCIOA, the association
would be able to sell the unit without having to go through
the difficult process of selling common area. This flexibility
is desirable.
Another significant difference occurs between the defini-
tion of "planned community" in UCIOA and "planned devel-
opment" in Davis-Stirling. UCIOA's definition is similar to
all jurisdictions, except California's. Under UCIOA, a
planned community is one in which an association owns the
common elements (area).8" In a planned development in Cali-
fornia, either the association may own the common area, or
the owners may own it as tenants in common.87 Thus, in
California, a developer can create two physically identical
projects in which the common area is owned as tenants in
83. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(7), (8), (10), (23)
(1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 479-88 (1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(c) (West 1982 &
Supp 1998).
84. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(8) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 479 (1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(f) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). Davis-
Stirling does not specifically prohibit the creation of common area that is not
subject to the Act, but it does not authorize the creation of such common area
and it was assumed during the drafting and legislative process that Davis-
Stirling would apply to all common area.
85. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103 cmt. 7 (1994), 7
pt. 1 U.L.A. 483-84 (1997).
86. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(23) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 481 (1997); see also id. § 1-103(8), at 479-80; and id. § 1-103(10), at 480
(defining condominium and cooperative respectively).
87. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(k) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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common and call one a condominium and the other a planned
development.
This anomaly arose because at the time Davis-Stirling
was enacted, some California local governments treated
planned developments and condominiums differently based
solely on the legal form of ownership, rather than on the
physical characteristics of the development. Thus, the attor-
neys for developers argued that the definition of "planned de-
velopment" should remain as it was so the developer could
chose to identify the project based on whatever local and
state regulation was the most lenient. Under UCIOA, this
problem is resolved, in part, by section 1-106, which limits
government's ability to discriminate based on the form of
ownership.88
UCIOA and Davis-Stirling also differ in that Davis-
Stirling includes two types of common interest developments
not specifically mentioned in UCIOA. UCIOA does not spe-
cifically mention limited equity housing cooperatives or com-
munity apartment projects as common interest communities
(developments).89 Both UCIOA and Davis-Stirling define a
cooperative as a form of common interest community in
which the association owns the development and the owners
have a right to the exclusive possession of a unit.9" However,
under California law, a stock cooperative specifically includes
a "limited equity housing cooperative" which is a cooperative
organized for a public purpose to provide low and moderate
income housing under the California Health and Safety
Code.9 UCIOA's definition of cooperative would include a
limited equity housing cooperative, but it is not specifically
mentioned.92
88. See discussion infra Part III.E.2.
89. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(7) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 481 (1997) states: "'Common interest community' means real estate
with respect to which a person, by virtue of is ownership of a unit, is obligated
to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance, or improvement
of other real estate described in a declaration." This definition is sufficiently
broad to include community apartment projects and limited equity housing co-
operatives, but neither of these is specifically mentioned as are condominiums
and planned communities. Id.
90. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(10) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 480 (1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(m) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
91. See CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM AND PLANNED DEVELOPMENT PRACTICE
§§ 1.25-1.26 (Continuing Educ. of the Bar eds., 1984 & Supp. 1998) for a discus-
sion of limited equity housing cooperatives.
92. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(10) (1994), 7 pt. 1
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Davis-Stirling also identifies community apartment proj-
ects as common interest developments. These are similar to
cooperatives because, in each, the owner has the exclusive
right to occupy a unit." They differ, however, because in a
community apartment project, the development is owned by
the owners as tenants-in-common; whereas in a cooperative,
the development is owned by a corporation. The term
"community apartment" is not only foreign to UCIOA, but the
authors are unaware of any jurisdiction, other than Califor-
nia, that recognizes it as a form of common interest develop-
ment.
D. Definitions Not Included in Davis-Stirling: "Master
Association" and "'Master Planned Community"
While the two definitions discussed above exist in Davis-
Stirling, and not UCIOA, other definitions exist in UCIOA
and not in Davis-Stirling. One definition existing in UCIOA,
and not Davis-Stirling, is "master association."94 A master
association is one which governs or manages more than one
condominium, cooperative (stock cooperative) or planned
community (development).9 It may be established by either
the initial declaration for a community, or the owners of two
or more common interest communities (developments) may
amend their declarations to delegate duties to a master asso-
ciation." The owners can establish the master association as
the only owners' association, or as a separate association
with each of the component common interest communities
also having their own subassociations 7
Once the master association is established, provisions of
UCIOA control its operation.98 For example, a master asso-
ciation may only adopt budgets and collect assessments from
unit owners to the extent expressly permitted in the declara-
U.L.A. 480 (1997).
93. A community apartment project is a common interest development in
which an undivided interest in land is coupled with the right to exclusive occu-
pancy of a unit. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1351(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
94. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(20) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 480 (1997).
95. Under UCIOA, a master association does not own common area. UNIF.
COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(20) (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 480
(1997); Id. § 2-120, at 564-65.
96. Id. § 2-120 cmt. 3.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 2-120, at 564-65.
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tions for the communities that are served by the master asso-
ciation, unless the master association is itself created as a
single unit owners' association.99 Further, if the declaration
of a common interest community provides that the board may
delegate certain powers to a master association, the board
members are not liable for the acts or omissions of the master
association with respect to those powers following the delega-
tions."0o
Davis-Stirling does not have similar provisions. The De-
partment of Real Estate (hereinafter DRE) Regulations,'
enacted pursuant to the Subdivided Lands Act,10 2 however,
contain regulatory provisions relating to "master plan devel-
opments." "Master planned developments" are defined as
planned development subdivisions meeting the following cri-
teria: (1) the master planned development must generally
consist of 500 or more separate residential interests and one
or more subdivisions, which may include time-share projects
or other residential, recreational, commercial or mixed resi-
dential and non-residential projects; (2) it must be developed
in two or more phases; and, (3) it must be managed by a mas-
ter association "that is responsible for the maintenance and
operation of areas and/or facilities affecting the Master
Planned Development and enforcement of use restrictions
pertaining to the Master Planned Development. " "'
The regulations address: voting rights, quorums for
membership meetings, election of the governing board, length
of time in which the declarant may exercise control, and the
creation of subassociations to operate within various phases
of the development.' These types of provisions are also set
forth in UCIOA.'0
Even though master associations are addressed in the
DRE regulations, UCIOA provisions should be included in
99. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-120 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
564-65 (1997).
100. Id.
101. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, ch. 6 (1998).
102. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11000-11200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
103. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.32(a) (1997) also provides if a subdi-
vider can demonstrate specific facts indicating why the development is a Mas-
ter Planned Subdivision even though it doesn't meet these criteria the Depart-
ment of Real Estate may still consider it such a subdivision.
104. Id.
105. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-120(d) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 564-65 (1997).
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Davis-Stirling for several reasons. First, the Department of
Real Estate Regulations have limited jurisdiction. They only
apply to the initial declaration and continue only as long as
the declarant is in control of the property. 16 Second, because
UCIOA provides numerous "default provisions" when the
declaration is silent, its approach to master associations pro-
vides greater certainty in the law relating to the governance
of these associations. Third, the definition of master associa-
tion in UCIOA is more flexible, in that it does not specify a
size requirement."7 Finally, property rights should be cre-
ated by the state legislature; not by administrative agencies.
Therefore, the legislature should consider adopting the provi-
sions of UCIOA pertaining to master associations.
III. CREATION OF COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES
A. Time of Creation
Under UCIOA a common interest community is created
"only by recording a declaration executed in the same manner
as a deed and, in a cooperative, by conveying the real estate
subject to the declaration to the association.""8 The declara-
tion must be recorded and indexed in the name of the com-
mon interest community. It must also be recorded in the
name of each person executing the declaration, including the
name of the lessor, if the common interest community is on
leased property.0 9
Although a common interest community is not created
until the above requirements have been satisfied, any project
that satisfies the definition of common interest community in
section 1-103(7) of UCIOA is subject to the act, even if the re-
quirements have not been met."0 Thus, a developer cannot
avoid the Act by merely failing to record a declaration.
By contrast, in California, "a common interest develop-
ment is created whenever a separate interest coupled with an
interest in the common area or membership in the associa-
106. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2792.32(b) (1997), CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10
§ 2792.32(c)(f)(g) & (i) (1997).
107. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-120(d) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 564-65 (1997).
108. Id. § 2-101, at 515-16.
109. Id. § 2-106, at 527-28.
110. Id. § 2-101 cmt. 3, at 516.
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tion is, or has been, conveyed" provided that a declaration, a
condominium plan (if one exists), and a final or parcel map (if
required), are recorded."' Thus, California law differs from
UCIOA in that a common interest development is not created
in California until an interest is conveyed, whereas under
UCIOA, a common interest community is created when the
declaration is recorded. Although it is unusual for a devel-
oper to record a declaration, and not convey units or lots,"'
under California law, a developer is permitted to unilaterally
change the character of the project until the first unit is con-
veyed. Consequently, California law permits somewhat more
flexibility.
California law also differs in that it does not require the
declaration to be recorded under the association's name or
under the name of each person signing the declaration."'
Having the project indexed under the association's name, in
particular, could make a title search easier. Therefore, the
legislature should consider adopting this provision of UCIOA.
B. Governing Documents
1. Declaration
Davis-Stirling provides that governing documents in-
clude the declaration, the bylaws, and the articles of incorpo-
ration."4 It also provides that a declaration recorded on or
after January 1, 1986, must identify the type of development
and contain a legal description of the development, the cove-
nants, the name of the association and any other provisions
the declarant or owners consider appropriate."5
In addition, the DRE regulations require the governing
documents of those developments within its jurisdiction to
contain "reasonable arrangements.""6
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1352 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
112. It is not uncommon, however, for developers, who create apartment
projects that have the potential for becoming condominiums, to record a decla-
ration at the time the building is developed and not convey separate interests.
This practice preserves the greatest flexibility for the developer by protecting
against future moratoriums on the conversion of apartments to less affordable
housing stock.
113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(j) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
116. The Subdivided Lands Act gives the DRE the authority to control,
among other things, the sale of separate interests in residential common inter-
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UCIOA does not specifically define governing documents.
Section 2-105, however, requires a declaration and is very
specific about what must be contained in the declaration.117
For example, the declaration must identify the following: the
type of common interest community and the names of the
community and association; the name of every county in
which any part of the community is situated, a description of
the boundaries; including the units (separate interests);
common elements (areas) and limited common elements
(exclusive use common areas); a description of rights re-
served to the declarant; restrictions on alienation; including
leasing, and provisions such as those relating to leasehold
common interest communities (developments); allocated in-
terests (assessment obligations, ownership interests, and
voting rights,) and common elements (areas).'18
UCIOA has special requirements if the community is on
leasehold property. For example, section 2-106 of UCIOA
provides that if the expiration of a lease will terminate or re-
duce the size of the community, the landlord must sign the
declaration."9 It also requires the declaration to provide the
recording data for the lease, or a statement as to where the
lease may be inspected, and the date the lease is scheduled to
expire. 2 ° Once a declaration for a leasehold condominium or
planned community is recorded, both the lessor and lessee of
the ground lease are precluded from terminating the lease-
hold interest of any owner so long as that owner makes
timely payment of his or her share of the rent and complies
with the covenants. 2' Furthermore, the rights of any indi-
vidual unit owner cannot be affected by the failure of other
owners to pay rent or fulfill covenants.'22
UCIOA also requires the declaration to deal with allo-
est developments of five or more units. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11000,
11000.1. (West 1987 & Supp. 1998). Pursuant to this authority the DRE en-
acted regulations which requires governing documents of common interest de-
velopments to contain "reasonable arrangements." See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10,
§§ 2792.15-2792.28 (1997). These provisions address issues regarding the op-
eration of common interest developments such as transfer of common areas,
assessments, meetings and voting rights, as well as many others. See id.
117. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2105 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
522-24 (1997).
118. Id. § 2-105(a), at 522-24.
119. Id. § 2-106(a), at 527.
120. Id. § 2-106(a)(1)-(2), at 527.
121. Id. § 2-106(b), at 527.
122. Id.
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cated interests, which include an owner's interest in the
common area, assessment obligations and voting rights. 123 A
significant difference between UCIOA and California law is
that UCIOA provides for the allocation of voting rights,
which cannot discriminate in favor of units owned by the de-
clarant."2 In other words the developer may not have more
votes per unit (separate interest) or square footage than the
other owners. In contrast, California declarants may have
three votes for each separate interest owned during the ini-
tial phases of the project, a practice which is authorized by
the DRE.'2
Although UCIOA does not permit weighted voting, it pro-
tects the declarant through the concept of "special declarant
rights." 126  UCIOA permits the declarant to retain, in the
declaration, special declarant rights, including among other
things the right to appoint members of the board until 75% of
the units are sold, and to complete the development without
interference. These special rights attach regardless of
whether the board is controlled by the owners or by the de-
clarant.127 Special declarant rights are property rights, trans-
ferable by the declarant."2
123. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
529-30 (1997).
124. Id. § 2107(d), at 530.
125. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.18 (1997).
126. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §1-103(29) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A_ 481-82 (1997),
127. Section 1-103 of UCIOA states:
"Special declarant rights" means rights reserved for the benefit of a de-
clarant to (i) complete improvements indicated on plats and plans filed
with the declaration (section 2-109) or, in a cooperative, to complete im-
provements described in the public offering statement pursuant to sec-
tion 4-103(a)(2); (ii) exercise any development right (section 2-110);
(iii) maintain sales offices, management offices, signs advertising the
common interest community, and models (section 2-115); (iv) use ease-
ments through the common elements for the purpose of making im-
provements within the common interest community or within real estate
which may be added to the common interest community (section 2-116);
(v) make the common interest community subject to a master association
(section 2-120); (vi) merge or consolidate a common interest community
with another common interest community of the same form of ownership
(section 2-121); or (vii) appoint or remove any officer of the association or
any master association or any executive board member during any period
of declarant control (section 3-103(d)).
Id.
128. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §3-104 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.LA
578-80 (1997).
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Consequently, even though UCIOA does not permit
weighted voting, it provides at least the same protection for
declarants as does California law. In addition, UCIOA
probably provides more flexibility. Under both Acts, the de-
veloper can retain control of the board until 75% of the units
are sold.'" UCIOA makes clear, however, that the declarant
can retain the right to complete the development, in accor-
dance with the governing documents, without interference
from the owners, even if the declarant does not control the
board. 30 Thus, under UCIOA, the declarant can transfer con-
trol of the association, thereby limiting the developer's future
liability for breach of fiduciary duty, and still complete the
development without interference. In addition, the declarant
can transfer all, or part, of the "special declarant rights."131
Likewise, under UCIOA, the declaration must identify
limited common elements (exclusive use common area) and
the units (separate interests) that have the exclusive use of
these limited common elements.'32 Once identified in the
declaration, they cannot be reallocated without the consent of
the affected owners."' While there is no provision in Davis-
Stirling addressing the reallocation of assigned exclusive use
common elements, California practitioners generally follow
the procedures outlined in UCIOA by assigning exclusive use
area to specific separate interests in the declaration.
Occasionally, however, they do not. For example, on oc-
casion, declarants create "floating" parking spots which they
assign at the time of sale. Because this flexibility may be
necessary in some developments, the legislature should not
prevent the declarant from creating unassigned, exclusive
use common areas, provided the declarant assigns these ar-
eas in accordance with the governing documents.
While the acts are similar in what they require in the
declaration, there are some significant differences. As dis-
cussed above, UCIOA provides more protection for owners of
leasehold common interest communities, does not permit de-
129. Id. § 3-103(d), at 576; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2792.32(f (1997).
130. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §3-103(d) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 576 (1997).
13L See discussion infra Part HI.D.1 for an additional discussion of the
transfer of declarant rights.
132. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-108 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
532 (1997).
133. Id. § 2-108(a), at 532.
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clarant weighted voting (but does provide declarant protec-
tion), and provides that limited common elements (exclusive
use common areas) can not be reallocated without the con-
sent of the affected owners. 3' The legislature should consider
adopting these provisions of UCIGA for the following reasons:
(1) the protections afforded declarants are as great using the
concept of special declarant rights, as they are with weighted
voting; (2) special declarant rights permit more flexibility;
(3) the owners of leasehold common interest developments
should be given protection; (4) it should be clear in Davis-
Stirling, that once exclusive use common areas are assigned
to particular separate interests, they cannot be taken away
without the affected owner's consent.
Another difference between the two acts is that UCIOA
requires plats and plans to be part of the declaration of con-
dominiums and planned communities and describes what
must be included in those documents."' While plats and
plans are not addressed in Davis-Stirling, they are covered by
the California Subdivision Map Act and local ordinances per-
taining to the parcel maps and subdivision maps." Because
these issues are adequately addressed by other statutes and
established case law, it is unnecessary for California to adopt
these provisions of UCIOA.3 7
2. Bylaws
UCIOA sets forth six required provisions for bylaws for
community associations: (1)the number, qualifications,
terms of office and duties of members of the board; (2)the
election of officers by the board; (3) the qualifications, powers
and duties of the board, and their terms of office; (4) the pow-
ers that can be delegated by the board; (5) who may execute
amendments; and (6) a method for amending the bylaws."
134. Id.
135. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107 (1994), 7 U.L-A. 533-
35 (1997). UCIOA section 2-109 provides a detailed list of the matters that
must be addressed in the plats and plans. Id. § 2-109, at 533-35.
136. CAL. Gov~r CODE §§ 66410 to 66413.7, 66425 to 66500 (West 1997).
137. While other statutes deal with mapping of common interest develop-
ments and building plans, they do not require the declarant to turn over those
maps and plans to the association. But see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10
§ 2792.23a(1) (1997). Because the association must maintain the common area,
a statute should require the declarant to give these maps and plans to the asso-
ciation.
138. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-106 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
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Other provisions can be added to bylaws unless the declara-
tion otherwise provides.139
Davis-Stirling contains no similar provision. This is
primarily because the task force that assisted the Legislature
in drafting Davis-Stirling concluded that California's Non-
profit Mutual Benefit Corporation Law adequately addressed
the internal governance of community associations and the
content of bylaws.' Further, even though some community
associations are not incorporated, section 1363 of the Califor-
nia Civil Code states that unless the governing documents
provide otherwise, an unincorporated association "may exer-
cise the powers granted to a nonprofit mutual benefit corpo-
ration, as enumerated in section 7140 of the California Cor-
porations Code."' 1 It is unnecessary for Davis-Stirling to
duplicate provisions of the Nonprofit Corporations Code.
Thus, it is, unnecessary for the legislature to adopt these
provisions of UCIOA.
3. Amendment of Governing Documents
There are substantial differences between the provisions
of UCIOA and Davis-Stirling regarding amendment of gov-
erning documents. Under UCIOA, with certain exceptions, a
residential common interest community may only amend the
declaration by a 67% vote."4 The exceptions, discussed in
greater depth in subsequent sections of this article, include
the following:
(1) Realocation of interests happens automatically in the
case of eminent domain.'"
(2) Certain unit boundary changes can occur upon the
consent of the affected owners.'"
(3) Declarant rights can not be increased, and the owner's
percentage interest in the community can not be
changed, without unanimous consent.'
584-85 (1997).
139. Id. § 3-106(b), at 585.
140. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7150-7153 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
141. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1363(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).




145. Id. § 2-117(d), at 546.
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(4) The time within which special declarant rights can be
exercised may be extended by 80% of the votes in-
cluding 80% of the votes held by owners other than the
declarant.
146
(5) Amendments that prohibit or materially restrict the
permitted uses or behavior in the unit, or that restrict
the number of people who may occupy the unit, re-
quire 80% approval.
147
(6) Communities that are not residential may require a
lower percentage to amend the declaration.
1 48
Amendments must be recorded and are effective only
upon recordation.19  Actions challenging the validity of re-
corded amendments must be brought within one year of the
recordation.'5
California law is more flexible in permitting amend-
ments to the declaration in many respects, but less flexible in
others. As mentioned above, in order to sell a unit or lot in a
residential common interest development of five or more
units, a developer must obtain permission from the DRE
which reviews the governing documents.' The DRE Regula-
tions allow the declaration to contain a provision permitting
the declaration to be amended by a bare majority of the votes
(including at least a bare majority of the votes not owned by
the declarant).' 5' Thus, California law permits owners hold-
ing a bare majority of the votes to amend the declaration,
whereas UCIOA requires 67% of the voting power to amend
in most cases."'
The provisions in Davis-Stirling dealing with amend-
ment also anticipate that, in many cases, owners holding
fewer than 67% of the votes may amend the declaration.
First, section 1356 of the California Civil Code provides that
146. Id. § 2-117(g), at 547.
147. Id. § 2-117(f).
148. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 546 (1997).
149. Id. § 2-117(c), at 546.
150. Id. § 2-117(b), at 546.
151. CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE §§ 11000-11200 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
152. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2792.24 (1997).
153. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11018.7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2793 (1997); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT
§ 2-117 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 546 (1997). While the declarant is in control of the
development all material amendments to the declaration must be approved by
the DRE. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11018.7 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
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when a declaration requires more than a bare majority vote
to amend the declaration, the owners may petition the court
to reduce the percentage required in the declaration for ap-
proving an amendment."4 In order to receive a court ordered
amendment, the association, or owner requesting the
amendment must do the following: satisfy specified proce-
dural requirements; demonstrate that at least a bare major-
ity approved the amendment; and show that the amendment
is reasonable. 5' If the amendment impairs a security inter-
est, the court cannot order such amendment without the ap-
proval of the percentage of the mortgages and beneficiaries
specified in the declaration, if one is expressed."6 If the de-
clarant's rights are affected, the declarant must also consent,
making this provision similar to that in UCIOA." 7
A second provision, pertaining to amendments applies to
older projects which do not contain any provisions regarding
amendment of the governing documents. If a declaration
does not contain amendment provisions, then the declaration
can be amended if the following are satisfied: (1) specified
procedural requirements are met; (2) more than a bare ma-
jority approve the amendment; and (3) the amendment has
been recorded in every county in which the common interest
development is located." 8
Davis-Stirling also simplifies the amendment process in
two different respects. First, it creates a simplified proce-
dure for amending the governing documents to delete provi-
sions pertaining to declarant rights after construction is
completed."' Second, it simplifies the procedures for deter-
mining when an amendment is effective. 6 ' Finally, Davis-
Stirling permits declarations that terminate on a specific
154. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1356 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
155. Id.
156. It is noteworthy that the court can approve the amendment without ap-
proval of the lienholders unless the amendment would impair the security in-
terest. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1356(e)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
157. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117(g) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 547 (1997).
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355.5.
160. Id. § 1355(a). The section provides that an amendment is effective after
the requisite approval is obtained, facts to that effect have been certified in
writing and executed and acknowledged by a specified officer, and the writing
has been recorded in each county in which the development is located. Id. This
provision simplifies the process by, among other things, overriding declarations
that require all owners and lienholders to sign the amendment. Id.
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date, and do not contain an extension provision to be ex-
tended if the requirements specified in the statute are satis-
fied.
161
Thus, California law, in some respects, is much more re-
ceptive to the concept of amendment, than is UCIOA. Cali-
fornia permits declarations to contain provisions requiring
only a bare majority to amend the declaration, rather than
the 67% required by UCIOA."6' It also provides statutory re-
lief for declarations that contain requirements for greater
than a bare majority vote or no amendment provision.16 Fur-
ther, there are no special provisions requiring an 80% vote
for amendments that prohibit or materially restrict the use
or behavior in a unit, as there are in UCIOA.' 4
On the other hand, Davis-Stirling does not have provi-
sions pertaining to amendment by eminent domain. It is
more difficult to alter boundaries by amendment, under
Davis-Stirling, than it is under UCIOA. Moreover, Davis-
Stirling does not provide for termination of the community
upon 80% approval, as does UCIOA."6 ' All of these aspects
will be discussed below in greater detail. Thus, in some re-
spects, UCIOA's amendment provisions are more lenient
than those of Davis-Stirling.
C. Lender's Rights
Under UCIOA, the declaration may require lender ap-
proval for specifications by the association, such as a sale of
part of the common elements (area).'66 The declaration, how-
ever, cannot provide for lender approval which affects the
general administrative affairs of the association, prevents the
association or its board from commencing, intervening or set-
tling litigation, or which prevents insurance trustees or the
association from receiving and disbursing insurance pro-
ceeds. 67
161. Id. § 1357.
162. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-117 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
546 (1997).
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1356(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
164. Id. § 2-117(f), at 547.
165. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-118 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
548-62 (1997).
166. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-119 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
562-63 (1997).
167. Id.; see also id. § 3-113, at 594-96.
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The only statutory provision in Davis-Stirling addressing
lenders' rights in connection with amending the declaration
is section 1356 of California Civil Code.168 Section 1356 re-
quires lender approval of court ordered amendments, when
the amendment would impair a security interest.9 Although
this is the only statutory reference to lender's rights in Davis-
Stirling, it is common for declarations in California to ad-
dress lenders' rights and give them protections required by
the secondary mortgage market.
D. Declarant Rights and Transfer of Declarant Rights
1. Declarant Rights
UCIOA gives the declarant several rights.7 For exam-
ple, UCIOA permits a declarant of a planned community to
amend the declaration to include additional real estate. The
declarant may do so provided the following requirements are
satisfied: the right is reserved in the declaration; the added
property does not exceed 10% of the land described in the
original declaration; the total number of units does not ex-
ceed the number stated in the original declaration; and, the
declarant adds the real estate within the time specified in the
original declaration.' The purpose of the right is to permit
developers to subsequently incorporate small parcels of real
estate into a "new town" planned community when such par-
cels could not have been acquired at the inception of the de-
velopment.'
Davis-Stirling does not specifically give declarants the
right to alter the development. Rights similar to those in
UCIOA, however, are addressed in the DRE Regulations. 7 '
Under DRE Regulations, if a declarant is planning on devel-
oping a large project in phases, the following criteria must be
168- CAL. CIV. CODE § 1356 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
169. Id.
170. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(14), 7 U.L.A. 480
(1997). Development rights (1994) as "any right or combination of rights re-
served by a declarant in the declaration to (i) add real estate to a common in-
terest community; (ii) create units, common elements, or limited common ele-
ments within a common interest community; (iii) subdivide units or convert
units into common elements; or (iv) withdraw real estate from a common inter-
est community." Id.
171. Id. § 2-122, at 568-69.
172. Id. § 2-122, at 569.
173. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.27 (1997).
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satisfied: (1) the right to annex property to the development
must be reserved in the declaration; (2) it must be in accor-
dance with a plan of phased development which is submitted
with the first phase of the development; and (3) it must be
approved by the DRE. 174 Because the DRE Regulations do not
contain limitations on the percentage of land, or number of
units that can be annexed, they are considerably less restric-
tive than the annexation provisions of UCIOA applicable to
planned communities.
Under UCIOA, property can be annexed even if it does
not meet the above criteria. In that case, however, the decla-
ration must require approval of two thirds of the voting
power of the association (not including the votes of the de-
clarant) before such property can be annexed. This provision
assures that proposals for unplanned annexations will be
presented to the members for consideration, although the su-
per-majority vote required may be difficult to achieve in a
large scale development. Other rights that UCIOA gives the
declarant include the right to: maintain sales officers; main-
tain models in the development; and maintain signs in the
development, provided the declarant reserves these rights in
the declaration.
175
Although Davis-Stirling does not specifically give declar-
ants similar rights, it is common for declarants to reserve
these rights in the declaration. Further, section 1355.5 of the
California Civil Code deals with amending documents to
eliminate provisions designed to "facilitate the developer in
the construction or marketing of the development."17 Thus,
Davis-Stirling indirectly assumes such declarant rights ex-
ist. These rights, however, should be created by statute,
rather than by regulation or implication. One difference be-
tween UCIOA and Davis-Stirling is that UCIOA provides
that if the declarant reserves such rights, the declaration
must provide detail as to the size and location of the facilities
in order to provide notice to owners of the reserved rights. In
California, the sales and management offices are generally
174. Id. Until recently, the developer's right to annex property pursuant to
an approved plan of annexation, and without the necessity of owner approval,
was limited in time. However, as of November 13, 1996 the time limit was re-
moved so long as the annexation remains pursuant to an approved plan. Id.
175. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-115 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
544 (1997).
176. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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built first. If, however, they are not, owners have a right to
know if they are buying next to a sales office. Therefore, the
legislature should consider clarifying the declarant rights in
Davis-Stirling by adopting provisions similar to those in
UCIOA.
UCIOA also grants the declarant an easement through
the common areas, to the extent needed to perform the de-
clarant's obligations or exercise the declarant's rights.'77 The
declarant, however, is responsible for any damage caused to
the common area, and is obligated to make necessary re-
pairs.178 Davis-Stirling does not specifically grant the declar-
ant an easement through the common areas to exercise de-
clarant rights, but such right is commonly contained in
declarations in California.
Under California general tort law, if the declarant dam-
ages the common area when using the easement, the declar-
ant will generally be liable for the damage. Rarely, however,
will general tort law create an obligation to repair. Thus, it
would be clearer if these rights were declared by statute.
2. Transfer of Declarant Rights and Special Declarant
Rights
179
UCIOA sets forth rules whereby a declarant can transfer
rights to others. Section 3-104 "strikes a balance between the
obvious need to protect the interests of unit owners and the
equally important need to protect innocent successors to a
declarant's rights ....
Any transfer of special declarant rights must occur by
an instrument recorded in each county where the develop-
ment is located and be signed by the transferee of those
rights. Once transferred, the transferor and transferee are
liable only for their own actions, unless the successor is an
affiliate of the transferor-declarant. 8' In other words, as-
suming the transferee is not an affiliate, once the transfer is
made, the transferor is liable only for obligations, liabilities
and warranties pertaining to the rights for periods prior to
177. Id. § 2-116(a), at 545.
178. Id. § 4-119(b), at 639.
179. See also supra Part III.B.1 discussing special declarant rights.
180. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-104 cmt. 2 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 580 (1997).
181. Id. § 3-104(b)(2), at 578.
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the transfer.'82 Similarly, the successor is not liable for the
previous declarant's misrepresentations, warranty obliga-
tions, breach of fiduciary duty or acts or omissions after
transfer.'
In California it is unlikely that a declarant who has no
affiliation with a successor declarant for all or a portion of
the same development will be liable for misrepresentations,
warranty obligations or acts or omissions of the successor.
Similarly a successor declarant who has no affiliation with
the declarant is unlikely to be liable for the predecessor's
breach of fiduciary duty or express warranties.' Whether a
successor declarant is liable for the acts of a predecessor is an
issue that most often arises in California in the context of
construction defect litigation.8 ' This will be discussed be-
low. 186
If a declarant's interests in the common interest commu-
nity (development) are foreclosed upon, UCIOA provides that
the person acquiring the interests in foreclosure may, upon
request, succeed to all special declarant rights pertaining to
the property. Such rights include the right to maintain mod-
els, sales offices and signs.'87 If the entire interest of a de-
clarant is foreclosed upon, or sold in bankruptcy, the declar-
ant ceases to have any further special declarant rights and
the period of declarant control terminates, unless the judg-
ment or instrument conveying title provides for the transfer
of the special declarant rights.'
There is no similar law in California specifically dealing
with declarant rights in the event of foreclosure. Davis-
Stirling should clarify those rights by adopting this provision
of UCIOA.
182. Id. § 3-104 cmt. 4, at 581.
183. Id. § 3-104 cmt. 5, at 582.
184. See CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES (Continuing
Educ. of the Bar, eds., 2d ed. 1990).
185. Id.
186. See infra Part IV.
187. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §3-105(c) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 544-45 (1997).
188. Id. § 3-105(d), at 445.
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E. Governmental Regulation of Common Interest
Developments
1. Regulation of Public Report and State
Administration and Regulation
Article 4 of UCIOA deals predominately with the protec-
tion of purchasers. Article 5, which is considered an optional
article, deals with the administration, and regulation, of
common interest communities.'89 While many of these provi-
sions are not included in Davis-Stirling, most are included in
other areas of California law. It is extremely unlikely that
the legislature would consider replacing the existing struc-
ture with the public reporting provisions in Article 4 of
UCIOA or the administrative provisions in Article 5. Be-
cause the goal of UCIOA and California law is to protect pur-
chasers, little is lost by failing to adopt these Articles. There-
fore, with the exception of one provision appearing in Article
4 dealing with developer liability, these articles will not be
discussed.
2. Statute and Local Ordinance Treating Like Projects
Similarly
Other provisions relating to governmental regulation in-
clude UCIOA section 1-106(a), which provides: "A building
code may not impose any requirement upon any structure in
a common interest community which it would not impose
upon a physically identical development under a different
form of ownership."' For example, while a building code can
impose a minimum fire wall rating in a high rise building, it
cannot impose one standard for apartment buildings and a
different standard for an identical building that is a common
interest community.
Further, a state or local government may not impose a
requirement on condominiums and cooperatives that it would
not impose on a physically identical building. UCIOA, how-
ever, permits local governments to regulate planned commu-
nities differently from cooperatives and condominiums. 9'
These developments are treated differently because histori-
189. See infra Part V.
190. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-106(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 495.
191. Id. § 1-106 cmt. 3, at 496.
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cally, most states have treated planned developments differ-
ently.
192
California law is similar to UCIOA, but not identical.
Section 1372 of the California Civil Code limits the extent to
which local governments may discriminate against a devel-
opment solely on the basis of its form of ownership. 9 ' The
statute provides that local zoning ordinances are presumed to
treat like structures in like manner unless the zoning ordi-
nance clearly expresses a contrary intent.' Thus, under
California law, while there is a presumption that zoning or-
dinances do not impose differing requirements on identical
structures based on form of ownership, if a local government
chooses to do so it may.
If governments were prohibited from discriminating in
this manner, it would be unnecessary for the developer to
elect to treat a development with common areas owned in
common, as either a planned development or condominium,
based on whether the government places heavier burdens on
one of these forms of ownership-a rather ridiculous situa-
tion. Local governments should not discriminate solely on
the basis of form of ownership. Therefore, it makes sense to
amend section 1372 of the California Civil Code to bring it in
conformance with the UCIOA provision, with one exception.
As mentioned, UCIOA permits local governments to im-
pose different standards on planned developments.'95 This
provision appears to assume that condominiums are attached
housing, and planned developments are detached housing.'96
This is not necessarily the case in California. Therefore, all
similar structures should be treated similarly.
117
192. Telephone interview with Carl H. Lisman, Chair of the Standby Com-
mittee, Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (1994), which prepared
UCIOA for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(Sept. 21, 1997).
193. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1372 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
194. Id.
195. See infra note 191.
196. Compare UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-106, cmt. 2
(1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 495-96 (1997), with id. § 1-106 cmt. 3, at 496.
197. Adopting this provision would not preclude local governments from im-
posing stricter standards on planned developments that are detached housing
than on planned developments that are attached housing. In this case the dif-
ference is based on the physical characteristics of the project and not the form
of ownership.
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3. Eminent Domain
Finally, UCIOA addresses condemnation.'98 The intent of
UCIOA is not to alter the law of eminent domain, but to
supplement it.'99 The goal is to state specifically what hap-
pens in the event a governmental agency condemns an entire
separate interest or common area, or any portion of a sepa-
rate interest or common area, through eminent domain."°° If
eminent domain leaves the owner with no practical use of his
or her property, then the condemning agency must compen-
sate the owner for both the separate interest and the interest
in common area, even if no common area is taken.'' If there
is a remnant of land, after condemnation, it becomes part of
the common area.02
UCIOA also provides a default position when part of a
unit or lot is taken and when part of the common area is
taken.03 It permits both the decree and declaration to alter
some of the default positions in order to guarantee a just re-
sult.
0 4
If the California legislature adopted this section, it would
be supplementing, rather than changing the state's law of
eminent domain, which is what the drafters of UCIOA in-
tended. The legislature would be filling a gap in the law re-
garding common interest developments by clearly stating
what happens when a governmental agency condemns a
common interest development, or portions of it.
IV. BOUNDARIES: CREATION, ALTERARTION AND TERMINATION
A. Creation
As mentioned above, both UCIOA and Davis-Stirling re-
quire the declaration to contain a legal description of the
common interest community.0 ° On occasion, however, a
declaration does not state precisely which area is owned
198. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-107 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
497 (1997).
199. Id. cmt. 1 at 498.
200. Id.
201. Id. § 1-107(b), at 497.
202. Id. § 1-107(a), at 497.
203. Id. § 1-107(b) & (c), at 497-98.
204. Id. § 1-10 7(a), at 497.
205. See infra Part III.B.
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separately by the owner, which are common elements (areas)
and which are limited common elements (exclusive use com-
mon areas). While there are minor differences in the two
statutes, both have the same purpose-to create certainty
when the declaration fails to do so. It is useful to know the
precise boundaries for a variety of reasons, such as deter-
mining maintenance and insurance responsibilities. A de-
fault position is particularly important in attached housing.
Consequently, when the declaration is silent, UCIOA °6
and Davis-Stirling2° provide that, unless the declaration pro-
vides otherwise, when walls, floors and ceilings are desig-
nated as boundaries, the interior surfaces are part of the
unit; any other portion are part of the common area. Al-
though there are minor differences, both acts provide a de-
fault position for determining when fixtures and bearing
walls are exclusive use common area and when they are
208
common area.
Even if the declaration is clear, a problem in the legal
description may arise if the physical boundaries of the
buildings in the legal description do not precisely correspond
to the actual physical boundaries of the buildings. Thus, sec-
tion 2-114 of UCIOA provides that, where existing physical
boundaries of a unit (separate interest) deviate from the legal
description, the physical boundaries control.2 9
A similar provision exists in Davis-Stirling.2 16 This sec-
tion, however, applies only to condominiums.21' The section
was taken from the Condominium Act existing at the time
Davis-Stirling was being drafted.212 Because the same prob-
lems of vertical and lateral movement and minor deviations
from the description in the declaration also can occur in at-
tached planned developments and cooperatives, as well as
condominiums, Davis-Stirling should be amended to apply to
all forms of common interest developments.
206. Id. § 2-102(1), at 519.
207. CAL. CIV. CODE §1351(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
208. See id. §§ 1351(I),(1); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-
102(1)-(4) (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 519 (1997).
209. Id. § 2-114, at 543.
210. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1371 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
211. Id.
212. Former CAL. CIV. CODE §1356 (West 1982) (repealed by stats. 1985,
c.874, § 13).
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B. Alteration of Boundaries
This portion of the article deals with the following: al-
teration of walls within a separate interest; alteration of
boundaries between separate interests; alteration of the
boundaries of common areas and exclusive use common ar-
eas; and termination of the common interest development.
Some declarations in California provide for any or all of the
above. It is unclear, however, the extent to which some of
these provisions, which ultimately change the extent of the
owner's property interest without the owner's consent, may
violate California law.
When a person buys a unit or lot in a common interest
development, he or she receives a separate interest and ei-
ther a tenancy-in-common interest in the common area or
membership in the association that owns the common area.
If the portions of the common area are sold or transferred to
a particular owner, or if the development is terminated, the
ownership interest of the individual is reduced. This pres-
ents the legal question whether these changes may occur
without the owner's consent.
In Posey v. Leavitt,213 a condominium owner brought an
action alleging, among other things, that the adjoining unit
owner did not have a right to build a deck that encroached
upon the common area without the consent of all the owners.
The court concluded that the plaintiff was correct. 14
In Posey, the declaration stated that the association had
the power to "sell, lease, transfer, dedicate for public use or
otherwise dispose of real or personal property in connection
with the affairs of the Association."215 The defendants argued
that this power implied the power to grant an easement for
the encroachment."6 The declaration also provided that the
owners had an easement over the common area, and that the
percentage of ownership of the common area could not be
changed without the consent of all the owners."7
The court concluded that because the encroachment im-
paired the easement rights of the owners, the declaration re-
213. 280 Cal. Rptr. 568 (Ct. App. 1991).
214. Id. at 574.
215. Id. at 573.
216. Id. at 574.
217. Id.
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quired unanimous consent.218 Further, although the associa-
tion owned the common area in question, this did not alter
the fact that the plaintiff had a property interest in the com-
mon area, an easement.219 This property interest could not be
impaired without the owner's consent.22°
Some argue that this holding should be confined to its
facts; that is, unanimous consent is only needed to change an
owner's percentage interest when the declaration requires it.
They further argue that when the declaration specifically
authorizes the association to dispose of the common area
without unanimous consent, such action should be permitted.
Others argue that the issue of changing an owner's in-
terest without consent is unresolved. They point to the fact
that in other jurisdictions where the issue has been adjudi-
cated, courts have concluded that owner's property interest
can not be changed without his or her consent."'
Due to this uncertainty, the legislature should enact a
statute that clarifies what conditions must exist for fewer
than 100% of the owners to change an owner's interest in the
property. UCIOA provides different statutory solutions de-
pending on the situation.2 Some of these solutions require
an 80% vote.2 3 When considering the various statutory solu-
tions, discussed below,22 the reader should consider what the
appropriate balance is between permitting flexibility and en-
suring that the owner's property interest will not be signifi-
cantly changed without his or her consent.
218. Id.
219. Posey v. Leavitt, 280 Cal. Rptr. 568, 574 (Ct. App. 1991).
220. Id.
221. See Grimes v. Moreland, 322 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Misc. 1974); Mackeever v
Lyle, 609 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. App. 1980); Penny v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of
Hale Kaanapali, 776 P.2d 393 (Haw. 1989); see also Schaumburg State Back v
Bank of Wheaton, 555 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (describing circumstances
under which an agreement did not reduce the percentage interest in the com-
mon area, and, thus, did not require unanimous approval); Jarvis, II v. Stage
Neck Owners Ass'n, 464 A.2d 952 (Me. 1983).
222. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OwNERSHIP ACT § 2-1111 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 497 (1997).
223. Id. § 2-218, at 548-62.
224. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
1045
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
1. Units (Separate Interests)
a. Owner Altering Unit (Separate Interest)
UCIOA provides if the alteration of a unit (separate in-
terest) does not impair the structural integrity or mechanical
systems of the affected unit (separate interest), or lessen the
support of any portion of the structure in which the unit
(separate interest) is contained, the owner has the right to
undertake an improvement or alteration, unless the declara-
tion provides otherwise."5 If the alteration will alter the ap-
pearance of the common elements (areas), or the exterior ap-
pearance of a unit (separate interest), or other portion of the
common interest community (development), however, the
project may only be undertaken with the permission of the
association. 26
Section 1360(a) of Davis-Stirling gives the owners simi-
lar rights to those granted by UCIOA. 7 In addition, section
1360(b) provides special rules for handicap access modifica-
tion.228 These have been pre-empted, however, by the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act229 and the Federal
Fair Housing Act. 3°
b. Owner Combining Units (Separate Interests)
Subject to the provisions of the declaration, UCIOA per-
mits an owner of two adjoining units (separate interests) to
remove or alter any intervening partition, even if that parti-
tion is a common element (area), in order to join the two
units (separate interests).2 31 UCIOA provides, however, that
the removal of partitions does not alter the boundaries of the
units.2 32 Comment 4 to section 2-113 explains that while the
adjoining units (separate interests) may be used as one, they
225. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-111 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
497 (1997).
226. Id.
227. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. COMMON
INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-111 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 497 (1997).
228. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
229. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900 to 12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998).
230. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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do not become a single unit (separate interest)." This be-
comes important when considering issues such as the alloca-
tion of assessments and votes.
There is no corresponding provision in Davis-Stirling.
The legislature should consider including this type of flexi-
bility. Again, the ease of combining units may be particularly
important in commercial and industrial developments, but it,
also, may be beneficial in some residential developments.
The declaration can always preclude such alterations in de-
velopments where alterations would be unreasonable.
c. Owner Subdividing a Unit (Separate Interest)
Under UCIOA, owners can subdivide their units, pro-
vided the subdivision is permitted in, and consistent with,
the declaration. 34 UCIOA contemplates that the owner de-
siring to subdivide his or her unit will apply to the associa-
tion, which is then obligated to prepare an amendment to the
declaration. 5 The amendment must be prepared by the as-
sociation, signed by the owner, assigned a new identifying
number for each of the newly created units (separate inter-
ests) and have the voting and assessment rights "in any rea-
sonable manner prescribed by the owner."36
No similar provision exists in California law, other than
the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act and local ordi-
nances relating to boundary line adjustments and amend-
ments to previously filed final subdivision maps.131 It is
common for the governing documents of residential common
interest developments to prohibit the subdivision of separate
interests. Subdivision may be undesirable because it could
have an adverse impact on the association's assessment base,
the market value of the lots, parking congestion within the
development or other aesthetic considerations of the neigh-
borhood. UCIOA does not provide that the declaration must
permit subdivision of units; it only provides that the declara-
tion may do so.
23 8
The right to subdivide the separate interest is particu-
233. Id. § 2-113 cmt. 4, at 540.
234. Id. § 2-113, at 539-40.
235. Id.
236. Id. § 2-113(b).
237. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66469 to 66472.1 (West 1997).
238. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-113 cmt. 4 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 543 (1997).
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larly important in commercial and industrial developments,
but also may be advantageous in some residential planned
developments. Therefore, the legislature should permit this
flexibility where the declarant or owners deem it advisable.
d. Owners Changing Boundaries Between Units
(Separate Interests)
Unless prohibited by the declaration or local laws,
UCIOA also permits adjoining unit owners to alter the
boundaries between their units by applying to the association
for an amendment to declaration.239 In connection with the
reallocation of boundaries, the owners may propose to the
board of directors that the voting rights and assessments be
altered; this would be appropriate where voting rights or as-
sessments are based on square footage. Once a reallocation
is proposed, the board has thirty days in which to determine
whether the reallocations are reasonable.24 °
If the reallocations are approved, the association is obli-
gated to prepare an amendment to the declaration that iden-
tifies the units involved and sets forth the revised realloca-
tions. 41 The amendment must be executed by the affected
unit owners, contain records of conveyance between them,
and be recorded. 42 The association also must prepare and re-
cord any other necessary documents which describe the al-
tered boundaries of the affected unit, their dimensions, and
their identifying numbers. 4 Again, Davis-Stirling does not
contain similar provisions. The California legislature should
consider permitting declarants and owners this flexibility.
2. Limited Common Elements (Exclusive Use Common
Areas)
UCIOA also permits the owners, other than the declar-
ant, to alter limited common elements (exclusive use common
area) under certain circumstances. 44 UCIOA requires the
declaration to specify to which unit (separate interest) or
units, each limited common element (exclusive use area) is
239. Id. § 2-112, at 540-42.
240. Id. § 2-112 cmt. 2, at 541.
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allocated.2 45 Once that description is presented in the decla-
ration, it cannot be altered without the consent of the owners
whose units are affected.246 If the affected owners agree,
UCIOA permits the affected owners to reallocate their lim-
ited common elements and execute an amendment to the
declaration.2 47 They do not need the permission of the other
owners to exercise this right.2 48 The right to reallocate lim-
ited common elements (exclusive use common areas) may be
restricted or denied in the declaration.249
No similar provision exists in California law. There is no
reason, however, to deny a declarant or the owners the right
to build this flexibility into the development. Therefore, the
legislature should consider adopting this provision of UCIOA.
UCIOA also permits portions of the common elements to
be reallocated as limited common elements by amendment.
This may only be accomplished pursuant to provisions in the
declaration. 2 ' There is no California statutory authority for
changing common area into exclusive use common area and it
may be desirable to permit this flexibility. For example, once
a new garden wall or fence is extended into the common area,
it is difficult to get a court to order removal. The association
should have the flexibility to grant easements for such en-
croachments, and perhaps to require the owner who en-
croached on the common area to maintain the encroachment
and indemnify the association, without needing unanimous
consent.
3. Common Elements (Common Area)
Finally, assuming there are no prohibitions in the decla-
ration or local ordinance, UCIOA gives the owners the right
to alter their units (separate interests) in ways which appro-
priate portions of the common area under certain circum-
stances.251  To effectuate the appropriation of common ele-
ments (areas), the owner of the unit must apply to the
245. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-108(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 532 (1997).
246. Id.
247. Id. § 2-108(b), at 532.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 2-108(c), at 532.
251. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-112 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
540-41 (1997).
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association for an appropriate amendment to the declaration.
The amendment must be approved by at least 67% of the
votes in the association, excluding the votes of the declar-
ant. 252
A proposed amendment must describe any fees or
charges payable by the owner in connection with the pro-
posed boundary relocation."3 Those fees are deemed to be as-
sets of the association.254 If the amendment is approved, it
must be executed both by the unit owner whose boundary is
being relocated, and by the association.25
No similar provision exists in California law. If this pro-
vision of UCIOA were adopted in California, the owners
would have to consider the potential harm the development
might suffer to the aesthetics of the project through piece-
meal appropriations of common area. In some developments,
however, the owners may prefer not to be assessed for com-
mon area that they do not use, and, thus, prefer to reallocate
the common area and its maintenance responsibility to a sin-
gle owner. For example, when garage doors, sliding doors, or
windows are common area, the owners may decide they
would prefer the individual owner, rather than the associa-
tion, be responsible for maintaining the fixtures. Owners
may, therefore, choose to make the fixtures exclusive use
common area.
Once again, the declaration may prohibit such a practice
in developments where it would be inadvisable. There is no
reason, however, to assume this practice is undesirable in all
common interest developments. Therefore, the legislature
should consider adopting this provision and the flexibility it
permits.
4. Termination
a. By Agreement of the Owners
UCIOA addresses an important issue that is often not
well addressed in California declarations: the circumstances
under which a common interest community can be termi-
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nated by the owners. 56 This issue was critical following the
Los Angeles earthquake of 1994. Major portions of some
common interest developments were destroyed and no termi-
nation provisions existed in the governing documents.
Under UCIOA, the decision to terminate a common in-
terest community (development) must be evidenced by an
agreement signed by owners holding at least 80% of the vot-
ing power of the association (the declaration may provide for
a higher percentage).257 UCIOA also contemplates that lend-
ers may require a greater than 80% vote to terminate a com-
mon interest development.258
The agreement must be executed by the requisite num-
ber of members "in the same manner as a deed," and re-
corded in each county in which the development is located.259
If the termination contemplates a sale of any real estate
forming a part of the development, the agreement must set
forth the minimum terms of the sale. 6°
When the property comprising the development is to be
sold in connection with a termination of the project, the asso-
ciation acts as a trustee on behalf of the unit owners in ef-
fecting the sale and distributing the proceeds. 61 During the
period prior to completion of the sale, the owners have the
right to continue to occupy their units in the terminated de-
velopment, unless the termination agreement provides oth-
erwise.62 During any period of continued occupancy, the
owners remain liable for the payment of assessments to the
association.263
If the property constituting the common interest com-
munity (development) is not to be sold and the community is
a condominium or a planned community, title to all the real
estate vests in the unit owners as tenants-in-common. 26 The
interests of each unit owner following the termination are es-
tablished by appraisal of the fair market value of each
256. Id. § 2-118, at 548-51.




260. Id. § 2-118(a)-(b), at 548.
261. Id. § 2-118(g).
262. Id.
263. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-118(e) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 549 (1997).
264. Id. § 2-118(f), at 549-50.
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owner's respective units; allocated interests (assessment ob-
ligations and voting rights); and, limited common elements
(exclusive use common area) immediately prior to the termi-
nation.265
The only provisions in Davis-Stirling relating to termina-
tion appear in section 1359 of the California Civil Code.266
This section applies only to condominiums and provides that
the court can order a sale of the entire project if one of the
following occurs: (1) more than three years prior to the filing
of the partition action, the project was damaged or destroyed
rendering a material portion unfit for its prior use, and the
condominium has not been rebuilt; (2) three-fourths or more
of the project is destroyed, and the owners holding more than
50% interest in the common area oppose repair or restoration
of the project; (3) the project has existed for over fifty years,
is obsolete, and owners holding more than 50% of the interest
in the common area oppose restoration of the project; or
(4) the sale is made in accordance with the governing docu-
ments.267 This code section applies only to condominiums, not
the other forms of common interest developments.268
Some planned development governing documents ad-
dress this issue, but others do not. Even those that provide
for termination without unanimous approval, may violate
California law.2" Therefore, the legislature should consider
adopting this section of UCIOA both because it permits a de-
clarant, or owners, to determine that fewer than 100% can
terminate a development, and because it provides a default
provision. If the legislature considers this provision, it
should consider whether the 80% vote requirement strikes
the appropriate balance between permitting change in re-
sponse to changing conditions, and protecting an owner's
property interest.
b. By Foreclosure of Lien Against the Entire, or
Portion of, the Community
UCIOA addresses the unlikely prospect of the foreclosure
265. Id. § 2-118(j), at 550-51.
266. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1359 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See supra Part IV.B regarding changing an owners interest without his
or her consent.
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of a lien or encumbrance against the entire common interest
development, and the more common prospect of a foreclosure
of a lien against only a portion of the development, such as a
unit (separate interest).27 ° In both instances, the foreclosure
does not withdraw the foreclosed property from the develop-
ment unless the foreclosure relates to "withdrawable real es-
tate,"27' or is a foreclosure of an encumbrance created by the
association. 72 In the latter case, the person acquiring the
property can require the association to amend the declaration
to exclude the property from the development.273
While foreclosure of blanket liens is not addressed in
Davis-Stirling, such liens are addressed in section
1108.5(a)(2) of California Business and Professions Code and
section 2792.3 in title 10 of California Code of Regulations,
which require that common areas and common facilities be
conveyed to the owners' association free of any liens or en-
cumbrances.27 The sections do not address what happens if
the owners subsequently encumber the common area.
UCIOA further provides that, in a condominium or
planned community, if there is a lien or encumbrance against
a portion of the development that has priority over the decla-
ration, and that lien is foreclosed, the foreclosing parties may
record an instrument excluding the acquired property from
the common interest development.275 Again, there is no
similar provision in Davis-Stirling and the issue should be
addressed.
V. GOVERNANCE
A. Organization of Association
1. Creation and Membership
Both UCIOA and Davis-Stirling require common interest
communities to create an association by the date the first
270. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-118(k)-(1) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 550-51 (1997).
271. See id. § 2-105(a)(8), at 523; and id. § 2-110(d), at 537-38.
272. Id. § 2-118(k)-(1), at 551.
273. Id.
274. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1108.5(a)(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.3 (1990).
275. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-118(1) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 551 (1997).
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unit (separate interest) is conveyed.76 UCIOA, however, re-
quires that the association be exclusively comprised of the
owners within the development."' While all owners in Cali-
fornia must be members of the association, some California
governing documents permit associate members who have
the right to use recreational facilities, but do not have voting
rights. Some argue that section 7331 of the California Corpo-
rations Code, which permits two classes of membership if the
articles or bylaws so provide,278 authorizes this arrangement.
Others argue, however, that there is no clear statutory
authority for this arrangement, and that there should be.
2. Association Rights and Obligations
Section 3-102 of UCIOA sets forth an extensive list of
powers that may be exercised by the owners' association, re-
gardless of whether it is incorporated or unincorporated.279
There is no similar provision in California law, but it is cus-
tomary for the bylaws of the association to set forth a list of
powers quite similar to those found in UCIOA. In addition,
section 1363(c) of the California Civil Code states that if an
owners' association for a California common interest devel-
opment is organized as an unincorporated association, that
association is deemed to have all of the powers of a nonprofit
mutual benefit corporation, as set forth in section 7140 of the
California Corporations Code.28°
a. Standing
Under UCIOA, the association's standing to bring a law-
suit is broader than it is under California law. UCIOA gives
the association standing to "institute, defend, or intervene in
litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name on
behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affect-
276. Id. § 3-101, at 571-72; CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1363 (West 1982 & Supp.
1998); CAL. Civ. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.8 (1997).
277. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-101 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
571 (1997).
278. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7331 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
279. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
572-74 (1997).
280. See, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.21(b) (1997) which controls the con-
tent of the initial governing documents, imposes limitations on the authority of
the Board to exercise certain powers without prior approval of the members.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1363(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
1054 [Vol. 38
1998] CAL. COMMON INTEREST LAW vs. UCIOA
ing the common interest community."28' Section 383 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure is similar in that it pro-
vides that the association has standing to: institute, defend,
and participate in administrative proceedings; arbitrate and
mediate in its own name; enforce the governing documents;
and recover for damage to the common area, areas which the
association is obligated to maintain or repair, and separate
interests integrally related to damage to the common area.28 '
It is difficult to determine the extent to which UCIOA
and California law differ because there are no reported Cali-
fornia decisions interpreting the standing provisions. How-
ever, there is clearly one significant difference. UCIOA gives
the association standing to enforce the governing documents
against a tenant.28 This is discussed below.
b. Engaging in Alternative Dispute Resolution
One of the powers listed in section 3-102(a)(18) of UCIOA
is the power to adopt regulations which would mandate that
disputes between the board of directors and unit owners or
between two or more unit owners, regarding the common in-
terest community, must be submitted to nonbinding alterna-
tive dispute resolution in accordance with the regulation.
This must be done as a prerequisite to commencing a judicial
proceeding.284 California law imposes this obligation by stat-
ute rather than giving the association the power to decide
whether to adopt alternative dispute regulations.28
Under section 1354(b) of the California Civil Code, per-
sons engaged in most disputes involving enforcement or in-
terpretation of the governing documents of a common inter-
est development must first endeavor to resolve those disputes
through some form of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"). 286 The parties are given a period of time to agree
upon the mode of ADR they wish to use; it may be either
binding or nonbinding.287 It is unlikely that the legislature
281. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102(4) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 572 (1997).
282. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1354(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
283. Id. § 3-102(4), at 573-74.
284. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102(a)(18) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 573 (1997).
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will eliminate this provision and leave it up to the association
to decide whether it wishes to engage in ADR as does
UCIOA.
c. Controlling Absentee Owners and Tenants
UCIOA presents some beneficial empowering language
regarding the authority of the association to adopt rules and
regulations affecting the use, or behavior, of occupants within
residential units.288 Among the authorized regulations, are
those that restrict the leasing of units (separate interest) "to
the extent that those rules are reasonably designed to meet
underwriting requirements of institutional lenders."289 This
language is intended to authorize, for example, restrictions
which limit the total number of units (separate interests)
that can be leased at any given time. Many institutional
lenders making loans on common interest properties follow
guidelines which restrict the total number of leased units,
currently set at 20%.290
UCIOA further authorizes the association to take action
directly against tenants who violate the development's gov-
erning documents. This includes, the authority to enforce
rights against a tenant, including bringing an unlawful de-
tainer action, and rights which the association could have ex-
ercised directly against the owner. 9' Evidently, these are not
powers which can be limited by appropriate provisions in the
declaration because there is no qualifying language to that
effect.
If such a provision were adopted in California, the legis-
lature should consider whether to permit the declarant and
the owners to determine if the association should have this
power. Such a power would solve many problems with ten-
ants violating the rules. In some developments, however, it
may discourage those who wish to rent units (separate inter-
ests). The owner has some protection because UCIOA condi-
tions the Association's authority to initiate disciplinary ac-
tion against a tenant upon providing notice and an
288. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-201(c) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 573 (1997).
289. Id.
290. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(e)(2) (1993).
291. Id. § 3-102(d), at 573-74.
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opportunity to be heard to both the tenant and landlord.292
d. Maintenance
Both UCIOA and Davis-Stirling provide that the associa-
tion is responsible for maintaining the common elements
(areas).29 When the declaration is silent as to who has the
responsibility for maintaining limited common elements
(exclusive common area), however, there is conflict. Both
UCIOA and Davis-Stirling provide default provisions to ad-
dress this problem; but those provisions are different. 4
Both Acts permit the declaration to alter the statutory
default position.295 Both Acts also provide that maintenance
and repair of the unit is the responsibility of the owner.296
They differ, however, in that UCIOA provides that the asso-
ciation is responsible for maintenance, repair and replace-
ment of the common elements including the limited common
elements.297 Section 1364 of the California Civil Code, pro-
vides that, unless the declaration states otherwise, the owner
is responsible for the maintenance and repair of any exclu-
sive use common area appurtenant to the owner's unit.9
One reason for placing the maintenance obligation of the
exclusive use common areas on the association is that the as-
sociation can better control the timing, quality and aesthetic
appropriateness of the repairs. Therefore, the legislature
should consider adopting the UCIOA provision.
e. Assessments and Liens
i. Regular and Special Assessments
UCIOA parallels section 1366 of the California Civil
Code in setting forth certain statutory rules pertaining to the
authority of community associations to impose assess-
292. Id. § 3-102(e), at 574.
293. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-107 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
585-86 (1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1364 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
294. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-107; CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1364.
295. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-107; CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1364.
296. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-107; CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1364.
297. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-107.
298. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1364.
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ments. 99 The rules set forth in UCIOA, however, are less
specific than those in Davis-Stirling. UCIOA provides that
until the association makes a common expense assessment,
the declarant shall pay all common expenses."' After an as-
sessment has been made by the association, the assessments
shall be imposed at least annually pursuant to a budget
which provides for the allocation of assessments in accor-
dance with the formula set forth in the declaration. This al-
location is subject to the following exceptions, if required by
the declaration: (1) assessments pertaining to expenses for
limited common elements or benefiting fewer than all the
units are allocated to those benefited units; (2) insurance as-
sessments are allocated in proportion to the risks that are
being insured; (3) utility assessments are allocated according
to the usage of the utilities; and (4) assessments to recover
expenses resulting from the misconduct of an owner are allo-
cated to that owner.0 1 If assessments are past due the board
can impose an interest rate, sometimes as high as 18%.302
Assessment provisions under California law are much
less flexible. Davis-Stirling requires the association to levy
regular and special assessments sufficient to perform its
functions. Annual increases in regular assessments, how-
ever, may not occur unless one of two conditions is met:
(1) the board has complied with section 1365 of the California
Civil Code, (which requires budgets to be prepared in accor-
dance with detailed provisions),0 3 and section 1366 (which
requires distribution of the budget within specified times);30 4
or (2) the board has obtained the approval of a majority of the
305voting power of owners constituting a quorum.
In addition, except in emergencies, the board may not
299. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-115 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
598-99 (1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1366 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).




303. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
304. Id. § 1366.
305. Id. A quorum, under section 1366 of the California Civil Code is more
than fifty percent of the owners.
306. Section 1366(b) of the Civil Code identifies emergency situations as:(1) extraordinary expenses required by court order; (2) situations creating
threats to safety; (3) expenses the association could not reasonably have fore-
seen; and (4) expenses associated with certain earthquake insurance sur-
charges. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1366(b).
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increase regular assessments more than 20% over the prior
year's regular assessment; nor may it impose special assess-
ments that, in the aggregate, exceed 5% of the total budgeted
gross expenses for the year in which the assessment is im-
posed, unless a majority of the voting power of owners consti-
tuting a quorum of 50% of the owners approve the increase.'
The original section dealing with imposing assessments
was a compromise. After its enactment in 1986, the assess-
ment provision was amended in 1987, 1990, 1991 and 1992,
again, as a result of negotiation and compromise among in-
dustry interest groups.' It is unclear whether the legisla-
ture would be willing to revisit the issue, in order to give de-
clarants and owners more flexibility in determining when
and how much assessments may be increased, is uncertain.
ii. Assessment Liens
UCIOA contains some beneficial rules regarding the
authority of community associations to collect delinquent as-
sessments through lien and foreclosure remedies."9 Under
UCIOA, recordation of the declaration creates a statutory
lien, without the necessity of recording a Notice of Delin-
quent Assessment, as is required to create a lien under
Davis-Stirling.31 ° Both acts provide that the lien include not
only the amount of the delinquent assessment, but also fees,
charges, late charges, fines and other reasonable costs of col-
lection. "
Under UCIOA, the lien is in place prior to any delin-
quency. Thus, UCIOA contemplates that a delinquent owner,
prospective purchaser of a unit, or a foreclosing lender will
receive information regarding a specific delinquency by
making a request to the association for information regarding
unpaid assessments. Unit owners are then obligated to pro-
vide the information to prospective purchasers, which is
307. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2792.16, 2792.22 (1997) (ensuring that the
original declaration will include consistent provisions).
308. Participating in the legislative process were the Department of Real Es-
tate, the California Association of Realtors, the Community Associations Insti-
tute, the Executive Council of Owners Associations and others.
309. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
600-04 (1997).
310. Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1367(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
311. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §§ 3-102(a), 3-116(a)
(1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 572-73, 601 (1997).
1059
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
similar to California law."
A significant difference exists, however, between UCIOA
and Davis-Stirling. Under UCIOA, the association's lien is
prior to all other liens and encumbrances, other than the fol-
lowing: (1) liens and encumbrances recorded prior to the
declaration, and not subordinated; (2) first security interests
on the unit recorded prior to the date when the assessments
became delinquent, but not as to assessments accrued within
the six months prior to the lender initiating action to enforce
the lien; and (3) liens for real property taxes and other gov-
ernmental obligations.3 ' In California, by contrast, commu-
nity association assessment liens are subordinate to any lien
or encumbrance recorded prior to the association's notice of
delinquent assessment. The declaration may, and usually
does, contain provisions making the lien subordinate to first
trust deeds, even if recorded after the association's lien."4
The UCIOA provision, giving association assessment
liens priority over first security interests in the amount of six
months' of assessments, is intended to strike a balance be-
tween the interests of the development and those of the
lender.3 "6 Lenders can protect themselves at the time of is-
suing a loan by factoring in the possibility of the inability to
collect an amount equivalent to six months' assessments at
foreclosure. Moreover, lenders are harmed if the association
cannot afford to maintain the development because of its in-
ability to collect assessments. Therefore, the legislature
should consider adopting this provision.
Under UCIOA, any action by a community association to
enforce its assessment lien must be commenced within three
years from the time the assessment becomes delinquent.316
The process can be a foreclosure pursuant to a power of
sale.1 7 The Davis-Stirling Act contains no specific limitations
period. Actions on written contracts and books of account,
312. See section 4-109(a)(2) of UCIOA, id. § 4-109(a)(2), which is similar to
section 1368 of the Civil Code. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1368 (West 1982 & Supp.
1998).
313. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 600 (1997).
314. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1367(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
315. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
cmt. 2, 601 (1997).
316. Id. § 3-116(e), at 601.
317. Id. § 3-116(j), at 601.
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however, must be commenced within four years.318
Finally, UCIOA confirms that the association may seek
to have a receiver appointed to assist in the collection of de-
linquent assessments. 19 While not stated in the Davis-
Stirling Act, similar remedies would be available under Cali-
fornia law. 2'
f. Other Liens
UCIOA provides that, unless the association has encum-
bered the common areas of a development with a lien or se-
curity interest, (requiring approval of at least by 80% of the
members)321 a judgment for money against the association
cannot become a lien on the common areas of the develop-
ment. Instead, it becomes a lien against all the units in the
common interest community at the time the judgment is en-
tered.322 The lienholder may look only to each owner's unit
(separate interest), (and not to any other property of the
owner) to satisfy his or her claim. 323 If the association has
granted a valid security interest in the common areas to a
creditor, that creditor must first resort to his or her rights
against the common elements before attempting to enforce a
lien against an individual owner's unit.24
If two or more units are subject to a lien, other than a
deed of trust or mortgage, the owner of any of the affected
units may pay the lienholder the unit owner's proportionate
share of the total indebtedness. The unit owner, thereby, re-
ceives a release of the lien with respect to that owner's unit
(separate interest).325 Once such a payment is made, the as-
sociation is prohibited from assessing or having a lien against
that owner's unit for any portion of the common expenses in-
curred in connection with the lien. 8
This provision could be applied, for example, to a situa-
tion where an association obtains a bank loan to finance the
318. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
319. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(1) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 601-03 (1997).
320. See CAL. CT. R. §§ 349-355 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
321. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-112 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 591-92 (1997).
322. Id. § 3-117, at 605-06.
323. See id. § 3-117(a)(1), at 605.
324. See id. § 3-117(a)(2), at 605.
325. Id. § 3-117(a)(3), at 606.
326. Id.
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replacement of roofs and secures the payment of that obliga-
tion with a pledge of the proceeds that will be obtained by
levying a special assessment. In that circumstance, UCIOA
permits an owner to pay his or her proportionate share of the
special assessment; thereby, alleviating any future liability
on that assessment.327 This could be important to an owner
desiring to sell his unit free of past special assessment lien
obligations.
California has no analogous statutory provision. As the
number of aging common interest developments increases,
the need for bank financing for critically needed repairs and
restoration work, for which there are not adequate reserves,
is becoming increasingly common. In California, many lend-
ers will not take a security interest in the common area for
fear that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain clear
title and a marketable asset in the event of a default by the
association. The main alternative is to obtain a security in-
terest in future assessment revenues. Conservative lenders
typically require that owners approve a special assessment,
payable in installments, in an amount sufficient to timely
amortize the loan.
UCIOA could provide California lenders and associations
an alternative form of financing. Therefore, the legislature
should adopt at least portions of these provisions of UCIOA.
g. Insurance
UCIOA's approach to insurance requirements is more
comprehensive and consistent than California's. Section 3-
113(a) of UCIOA requires an association to maintain both
property and liability insurance to the extent it is reasonably
available, after the conveyance of the first unit.828 The Act
specifies that the property insurance must cover at least 80%
of the actual cash value. 29
In communities with horizontal boundaries, the property
insurance must include the units, but need not include im-
provements made by the owner.130 The comments to UCIOA
note that requiring the association to insure both the unit
327. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-117 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 605-06 (1997).
328. Id. § 3-113(a), at 594.
329. Id.
330. Id. § 3-113(b).
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and common area, in cooperatives and horizontal or stacked
communities, is a departure from the existing practice in the
majority of states.331 The drafters thought it preferable to in-
sure the entire building since it simplifies claims procedures,
particularly, where part of both the common elements and
the unit have been destroyed."2
Each association insurance policy must provide the fol-
lowing: (1) each owner is insured with respect to liability
arising out of his or her interest in the common area or mem-
bership in the association; (2) the insurer waives its right to
subrogation under the policy against an owner; (3) no act or
omission by an owner, outside the scope of his or her author-
ity on the behalf of the association, will void the policy; and
(4) if the owner has other insurance covering the same risk at
the time of loss, the association's policy must provide the
333primary insurance coverage.
UCIOA also requires the association to repair or replace
any portion of the property for which insurance is required,
unless the owners terminate the common interest commu-
nity, or 80% of the owners, (including 100% of those owners
334
whose limited common elements will be affected), agree.
331. Id. § 3-113 cmt. 2, at 596.
332. Id.
333. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-113(d) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 594-95 (1997).
334. See id. § 3-113(h), at 595-96. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1359 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1998). Section 1359 of the Civil Code deals with partition in which an
owner does not wish to repair or rebuild a damaged project; this has some rele-
vance to section 3-113(h) of UCIOA. Section 1359 of the Civil Code, however, is
more restrictive than section 3-113(h). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1359; and UNIF.
COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-113(h) (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 595-96
(1997).
First, section 1359 only applies to condominiums because this section was
incorporated directly from the previous Condominium Act which only applied to
condominiums. Second, section 1359 provides that the court may order parti-
tion only if one of the following is found:
(1) More than three years prior to the filing of the action, the project
was damaged or destroyed rendering, so that a material part was ren-
dered unfit for its prior use, and the condominium project has not been
rebuilt or repaired substantially to its state prior to the damage or de-
struction.
(2) Three-fourths or more of the project is destroyed or substantially
damaged and owners of separate interests holding in the aggregate
more than a 50 percent interest in the common areas oppose repair or
restoration of the project.
(3) The project has been in existence more than 50 years, is obsolete
and uneconomic, and owners of separate interests holding in the ag-
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Finally, UCIOA requires the association to promptly notify
all the owners if insurance is not readily available."'
Unlike UCIOA, Davis-Stirling does not require associa-
tions to maintain insurance. Davis-Stirling, however, has
provisions relating to insurance. If the association wishes to
limit the liability of owners, directors, and officers, then it
must satisfy certain insurance requirements in accordance
with sections 1365.9 and 1365.9 of the Civil Code.3 6 While
these requirements will be discussed in greater detail below,
... it is important to note that the amount of insurance re-
quired by these sections is inconsistent. Such amounts
should be made consistent.
The other insurance requirement in Davis-Stirling is
contained in section 1365(e) of the Civil Code. 38 This section
requires associations to provide a summary of the associa-
tion's property, general liability, earthquake and flood insur-
ance policies. This summary must include the name of the
insurer, the type of insurance, the policy limits, and the
amount of any deductibles."3 The association must also no-
tify the owners of any significant changes in coverage."'
There are additional requirements in both Acts but the
discussion above demonstrates that the insurance require-
ments in UCIOA are different than those in Davis-Stirling.
The major differences may be summarized as follows. First,
UCIOA requires associations to maintain a variety of insur-
gregate more than a 50-percent interest in the common area oppose
repair or restoration of the project.
(4) The conditions for such a sale, set forth in the declaration, have
been met.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1359(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
335. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-113(c) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 594 (1997).
336. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1365.7, 1365.9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
337. See infra Part VI.
338. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
339. Id.
340. While these are the only insurance provisions that exist in Davis-
Stirling, other California statutes and common law impose insurance require-
ments. For example, if the association has automobiles the association will
have to comply with CAL. VEH. CODE § 16431 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) if it has
employees it will have to maintain workers compensation insurance CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3700 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) and the fiduciary duty the directors and
officers owe the association presumably includes the obligation to buy both
property and liability insurance when it is reasonable to do so. CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 16431 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3700 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1998).
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ance coverage, where reasonably available.34' While Davis-
Stirling requires the association to disclose the coverage it
has and to maintain insurance if it wishes to gain limited
immunity for it owners, directors, and officers, it does not re-
quire associations to maintain insurance.42 Second, UCIOA's
insurance provisions apply more consistently than do those in
California; and they do not vary when dealing with director
and officer liability, and owner liability as they do in Califor-
nia.3
43
h. Rights and Obligations Found in Davis-Stirling
and Not in UCIOA
Davis-Stirling covers many topics not mentioned in
UCIOA. For example, sections 1365 and 1365.5 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code impose detailed requirements on commu-
nity associations regarding to following: the content and dis-
tribution of annual budgets and year-end financial reports;
the periodic evaluation of the adequacy of reserve accounts;
and the obligation of association boards to conduct a quar-
terly review of the association's fiscal performance in com-
parison to the budget.344 Section 1363.05 of the Civil Code
imposes meeting requirements and section 1375 imposes
numerous requirements in connection with filing a construc-
tion defect lawsuit to name a few.345 Many should be simpli-
fied and made more easy to understand or eliminated.
3. Board Members and Officers
a. Election
UCIOA authorizes the declaration to include a period of
declarant control, subject to limitation, during which the de-
clarant may appoint and remove all directors and officers of
the association.46 It further provides that there must be at
341. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-113 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
595-96 (1997).
342. The doctrine of fiduciary duty may require California association's to
maintain insurance, but it would be better to have a statute that is clear and
consistent determine the insurance requirements. See discussion infra Part V.
343. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-113 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 595-96 (1997).
344. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1365, 1365.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
345. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1363.05, 1375 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
346. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(e) (1994), 7 pt. 1
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least 1%, but not less than 25%, of director positions filled by
vote of the owners other than the declarant, once 25% of the
units (separate interests) in the development have been
sold. 47
Davis-Stirling does not address the issue of appointment
of directors and officers by the declarant. The DRE Regula-
tions, however, prescribe that "reasonable arrangements" be
included in the declaration which include providing termina-
tion dates for declarant control. 48 Further, the declaration
must establish a special procedure to assure that, from the
time of the first election, at least 20% of the directors shall be
elected solely by the votes of owners, other than the declar-
ant, as long as the declarant maintains control.349 In this re-
spect, UCIOA is similar to California law.
UCIOA also provides that directors may only be removed
from office on the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of
a quorum of the members.3 ° Directors elected by the declar-
ant may only be removed by the declarant.35 In California,
the removal of directors from office is governed by sections
7221 and 7222 of the Corporations Code.. and section
2792(b), title 10, of the California Code of Regulations. 53 The
cumulative voting provisions provided in these regulations
are designed to afford the opportunity for a significant mi-
nority bloc among owners to gain and maintain representa-
tion on the board. However, cumulative voting provisions
make it is practically impossible to remove directors from of-
fice, unless the recall is directed at all directors, in which
case the protective rules concerning cumulative voting rights
do not apply. Also, the provisions are difficult to understand.
The legislature should consider the simplified voting proce-
dures presented by UCIOA.
U.L.A. 575-77 (1997). With the exception of master planned communities, the
period of declarant control, however, must end no later than the earlier of the
following: (1) 60 days after conveyance of 75% of the units; (2) two years after
all declarants have stopped selling units; (3) two years after the declarant last
exercises rights to add units (separate interests); (4) the day the declarant vol-
untary surrenders control. Id.
347. Id. § 3-103(e), at 575-77.
348. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.18 (1997).
349. Id. § 2792.19(c)(1).
350. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(g) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 577 (1997).
351. Id.
352. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7220, 7221 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
353. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2792(b) (1997).
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b. Powers
The powers given to the board are also similar under the
two acts. UCIOA provides that the board may act on behalf
of the association, except as limited by the declaration, by-
laws, or other sections of the Act. " Section 7210 of the Cali-
fornia Corporations Code is similar in that it provides that all
powers are vested in the board, except where that member
approval is required either by state law or the governing
documents. 5
Not all powers given to the board under the two acts are
similar, however. UCIOA addresses the obligation of the ex-
ecutive board to provide members with a summary of the
budget within a specified period of time. The budget is then
subject to member ratification.356 If the members refuse to
ratify the budget, the budget from the previous fiscal period
continues until ratification is obtained. 57
In contrast, under section 1365 of the California Civil
Code, community associations are obligated to provide de-
tailed budget information to their members, not less than
forty days, or more than sixty days, prior to the beginning of
the fiscal year.55 Unless the budget proposes assessment in-
creases which require member approval under section 1366
of the Civil Code,5 budgets are not required to be approved
by the members. The absence of such an approval require-
ment is consistent with the overall concept of corporate gov-
ernance contemplated by the California Corporations Code in
which the board of directors have a fiduciary obligation to
manage the affairs of the corporation. This approach is pref-
erable to that of UCIOA.
Another difference is that UCIOA provides that once de-
clarant control has ended in residential common interest
communities, the successor board, has the right to terminate
the following contracts within 90 days: (1) any management
contract, employment contract, or lease of recreational or
parking areas or facilities; (2) any lease or contract entered
354. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 575 (1997).
355. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10 § 2792(b) (1997).
356. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(c) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 576 (1997).
357. Id.
358. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
359. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1366 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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into between an association and the declarant; and (3) any
contract that is not bona fide or was unconscionable when
made. 6' The authority to terminate contracts, however, does
not extend to the termination of any lease that would result
in a termination of the development or reduce its size.161 In
nonresidential communities, the declaration can permit con-
tracts with the declarant to continue after the declarant con-
trol has ended.
62
In California, while these issues are not addressed in
Davis-Stirling, they are addressed in the DRE Regulations
which control the content of the initial governing documents
and generally limit the duration of contracts with the asso-
ciation to a period of one year. 6' This section should be thor-
oughly considered before adoption. Permitting management
and employment contracts to be terminated upon ninety days
notice, following transition from developer control could
make it difficult for the association to secure stable contrac-
tual relationships with managers and employers, particularly
toward the end of the developer control period. On the other
hand, the provision may prevent abuse by declarants. Such
abuse occurred in Florida, where declarants made the asso-
ciation enter into ninety-nine year recreational leases that
were detrimental to the association.
4. Meetings of the Association
UCIOA requires community associations to conduct at
least one membership meeting per year and permits other
special meetings to be called by the president, by a majority
of the executive board, or by unit owners representing at
least 20% of the voting power of the association, unless a
smaller percentage is specified in the bylaws. 6 4 It also pro-
vides minimum requirements for the timing of notice of
member meetings and requires that the notice include "the
items on the agenda." 5 The section does not specifically re-
strict action to the items identified on the agenda, although
360. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-105 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
583 (1997).
361. Id.
362. Id. § 1-207, at 513.
363. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2792.21 (1997).
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that limitation is implied.
Matters of internal governance of community associa-
tions in California are governed primarily by the Nonprofit
Mutual Benefit Corporation Law. 66 For example, the Cali-
fornia Corporations Code requires a regular meeting of the
members to be held in any year in which directors are to be
elected. It permits as few as 5% of the voting power of the
members, as well as the president and board of directors, to
call special meetings of the members.367
In spite of the reluctance of the original drafting task
force to address matters of internal community association
governance in the Davis-Stirling Act, in the years since the
Act's adoption in 1985, numerous provisions have been added
to address matters that are either already covered in the
California Corporations Code or which are customarily ad-
dressed in corporate bylaws. For example, section 1365(e) of
the California Civil Code provides that notices of meetings
must specify the matters the board intends to present for ac-
tion by the members. Other authorized matters, however,
may also be presented for action at the meeting.368 That rule
is similar to the rule found in section 7511(b) of the Corpora-
tions Code requiring notice of regular membership meet-
ings."' One advantage of adopting a Uniform Law is that it
would minimize the enactment of duplicative or inconsistent
statutes.
a. Quorums
UCIOA presents quorum rules for both member and
board meetings.370 In the case of membership meetings, the
minimum quorum permitted is 20% of the voting power, de-
termined at the inception of the meeting, unless the bylaws
provide otherwise.3 71 For board meetings, the minimum quo-
rum is the presence, at the inception of the meeting, of direc-
366. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7110-8910 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
367. Id. § 7510(b), (e), at 236-37.
368. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365(e) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
369. Id.; CAL. CORP CODE § 7511(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); see generally
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1363, 1363.05 (West 1982 & Supp.1998) for other Davis-
Stirling provisions relating to the conduct of meetings.
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tors entitled to cast 50% of the votes on the board. 7 '
In California, with the exception of votes on increases in
assessments requiring member approval under Davis-
Stirling,373 the minimum quorum permitted for members
meetings is one-third of the voting power unless the govern-
ing documents provide otherwise.374 In order to provide a
measure of assurance that a very low quorum percentage will
not be abused, the Corporations Code states that if the quo-
rum for membership meetings is fixed at a percentage less
than one-third of the members, and less than one-third of all
members attend the meeting, action may be taken only on
those matters that were identified in the notice of the meet-
ing.
375
In the case of director meetings, a majority of the num-
ber of directors authorized in the articles or bylaws consti-
tutes a quorum of the board, unless otherwise provided in the
articles or bylaws. The law does not permit a quorum that is
less than 20% of the directors authorized, or less than two,
whichever is larger.376
As to both member and director meetings, the California
law parallels UCIOA in stating that if a person leaves a
meeting after the quorum is established, the meeting may
nevertheless continue.377 For both board and member meet-
ings, valid action requires approval by a majority of the
members required to constitute the quorum."'
b. Voting and Proxies
The are a few significant differences between the way
UCIOA and California law handle voting and proxies.
UCIOA addresses three issues regarding membership voting:
(1) the casting of votes allocated to units (separate interests)
owned by more than one person; (2) proxy voting; and (3) the
rights of persons leasing units to vote in lieu of the owner or
372. Id.
373. For votes on assessment increases, section 1366(b) of the Civil Code es-
tablishes a minimum quorum for the vote at 50% of the owners of the associa-
tion. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1366(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
374. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7512(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1998).
375. Id. § 7512(b), at 240.
376. Id. § 7211(a)(7), at 197.
377. See id. §§ 7211(a)(8), at 197, 7512(c), at 240.
378. Id.
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owners.37 9  The manner in which votes allocated to units
(separate interests) owned by more than one person is simi-
lar in the two acts. The manner in which proxy voting and
lessees' voting rights are treated, however, is different.
Section 3-110(a) of UCIOA is similar to the rule stated in
section 7612 of the California Corporations Code. Both pro-
vide that when memberships are held in two or more names,
the vote of any one of the co-members is binding upon all.38
However, if more than one co-member seeks to exercise the
voting rights of the membership, the vote of a majority of the
co-members binds all.38'
Some of the rules in UCIOA regarding proxies are simi-
lar to California law; others are more restrictive. Section
7613 of the Corporations Code and section 3-110(b) of UCIOA
both authorize voting by proxy."' UCIOA provides that once
a proxy has been issued, the owner of the unit to which the
vote is appurtenant may only revoke the proxy by actual no-
tice of revocation to the person presiding over the meeting.3
In California, the owner who issued the proxy may revoke it
by attending the meeting. 84 Under UCIOA, proxies termi-
nate one year following their date of issuance, unless the
proxy specifies a shorter term.385 In California, if the proxy is
not coupled with an interest, it is valid for eleven months
from the date of issuance, unless a shorter term is stated.386
Under California law, association bylaws may restrict, or
eliminate, the use of proxies all together.387 Because Califor-
379. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
588 (1997).
380. Id. § 3-110(a), at 588; CAL. CORP. CODE § 7612 (West 1984 & Supp.
1998).
381. Supplementing this rule in the California statute is section 7517 of the
Corporations Code which authorizes a person or persons counting ballots to ac-
cept a ballot signed by one of several co-members. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7517(b)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
382. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7613 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); UNIF. COMMON
INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A. 588 (1997).
383. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 588 (1997).
384. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7613 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). This section pro-
vides that the proxy is also terminated if the person issuing it dies and the cor-
poration before the vote is counted, receives written notice of such death or in-
capacity. Id. § 7613(c).
385. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110(b) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 588 (1997).
386. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7613 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
387. Id.
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nia law permits action to be taken by written ballot, without
a meeting, 8 (except in director election with cumulative
voting) some California community associations have elimi-
nated proxy voting all together in favor of voting provisions
that require all owners to cast votes personally, either by at-
tending a meeting or executing and returning a written ballot
to the association.8 9 UCIOA does not deal with proxy voting,
presumably because this topic is generally covered by corpo-
rate law.
UCIOA and California practitioners deal with the issue
of lessee voting differently. UCIOA permits a declaration to
provide that certain specified matters must be voted on by
lessees, rather than unit owners, as long as the unit owners
also are given notice of any meeting at which the owner's les-
see is entitled to vote.39 Generally, governing documents in
California provide for voting solely by owners of the separate
interests. In some declarations, however, particularly those
pertaining to properties in resort areas, where units are often
leased, provisions are made for voting by long-term lessees on
certain specified matters. The absence of lessee voting provi-
sions in California is no doubt attributable both to the fact
that the issue is a relatively new one, and to the fact that
unit owners are extremely reluctant to provide lessees with
any voice or authority with respect to important matters such
as collection of assessments, discipline, or maintenance of
common area.
As discussed above, UCIOA gives the association signifi-
cant power over tenants. This power is balanced by giving
tenants more rights. 9' It would be interesting to know if
there are fewer lessee problems in states that have adopted
1994 amendments to UCIOA.
388. Id.
389. It should be noted that UCIOA does not prohibit voting by written bal-
lot.
390. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110(c) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 588 (1997).
391. See supra Part V.A(4)(b).
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VI. LIABILITY
A. Declarant Liability
1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
UCIOA clearly states that non declarant board members
shall exercise the degree of care required by a director of a
corporation. The declarant-appointed board members, how-
ever, "shall exercise the degree of care and loyalty required of
a trustee."39 The comments to section 3-103 further state
that UCIOA intentionally holds the declarant appointed
board members to a higher standard of care. 93
Section 7231 of the California Corporations Code does
not distinguish between declarant appointed directors and of-
ficers and other directors and officers." 4 Neither is held to
the standard of a trustee. Instead, section 7231 of the Cali-
fornia Corporations Code requires all directors to exercise or-
dinary care. This includes acting in good faith, in a manner
the director believes to be in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, and acting with the care of an ordinarily prudent per-
396
son.
Case law has supplemented the statutory law. In Ra-
ven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Development Co.,396 the
court reiterated that directors "may not make decisions for
the association that benefit their own interests at the ex-
pense of the association and its members." 97 In addition, the
court implied that stricter standards apply while the declar-
ant controls the project and "closer judicial scrutiny may be
felt appropriate."98 Thus, while the Corporations Code does
not hold the declarant appointed directors to a higher stan-
dard of care, case law may. This potential conflict should be
clarified by statute.
392. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 575 (1997).
393. Id. cmt. 6, at 577.
394. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7231 (West 1984 & Supp. 1998).
395. CAL. CORP. CODE § 7231(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1998). Section 7233 of
the California Corporations Code is also relevant in that it permits the board of
directors to approve transactions in which a director has a financial interest,
but only if the transaction is just and reasonable to the corporation. Id. § 7233.
396. 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1981).
397. Id. at 343.
398. Id.
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2. Construction Defect
A thorough discussion of liability for construction defects
is beyond the scope of this article.9 Furthermore, this topic
has been under review by the Lockyer Task Force for the past
couple of years. It is unlikely that the task force or the leg-
islature will propose that the provisions in UCIOA dealing
with breach of warranty should replace California law. A
short discussion of the difference between the two Acts, how-
ever, will demonstrate some differences.
UCIOA holds the declarant liable for both express and
implied warranties.400 A declarant impliedly warrants that a
unit will be suitable for its intended purposes, is free from
defective materials, and is constructed in accordance with the
law and sound construction principles.4"' A successor of the
declarant, assuming the successor is not an affiliate, is not
liable for the misrepresentations of a previous declarant,
warranty obligation on improvements made by a previous
declaration, or any breach of fiduciary obligation by a previ-
ous declarant.4 '
Under California law, developers may be sued under the
theories of implied warranty and strict liability. Strict li-
ability covers the same types of conditions as implied war-
ranties: defective materials, construction not in accordance
with the law or sound construction principles. In some situa-
tions, however, an implied warranty theory may be the better
theory. For example, if a plaintiff can not establish a defec-
tive condition, but can prove the lack of habitability or fitness
for a particular purpose, an implied warranty theory is pref-
erable. In other situations, strict liability may be a better op-
tion for a plaintiff. For example, when the plaintiff is a suc-
cessive purchaser, he or she will probably not be able to
recover under an implied warranty theory,4 ' but may recover
399. See JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.
1997 & Supp. 1998); THOMAS E. MILLER, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION DEFECT
LITIGATION (1993 & Supp. 1997); see also, CURTIS SPROUL & KATHARINE
ROSENBERRY, ADVISING CALIFORNIA CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER As-
SOCIATIONS ch. 11 (Continuing Educ. of the Bar eds., 1994 & Supp. 1997).
400. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §§ 4-113, 4-114 (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 548-62 (1997).
401. Id. § 4-114, at 632; see also id. § 4-113, at 630-31; id. § 4-115, at 634;
and id. § 4-116, at 635-36.
402. Id. § 4-114 cmt. 8, at 633-34.
403. See E. Hilton Drive Homeowners' Ass'n. v. W. Real Estate Exch., Inc.,
186 Cal. Rptr. 267, 268 (Ct. App. 1982).
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under a strict liability theory. °4
With a noticeable absence of hard data to support the
contentions of the debating parties, this area of law is cur-
rently hotly debated. The main issue-the extent to which
developers, subcontractors and those involved in the con-
struction process should be liable-is difficult to resolve.
Thus, the legislature has enacted statutes that nibble around
the edges of the problem. These statutes, such as section
1375 of the California Civil Code, which provides numerous
requirements for pursuing construction defect litigation, of-
ten raise more problems than they solve. 45 The legislature
needs to enact comprehensive, easy to understand legislation
in this area.
The statute of limitations for breach of warranty under
UCIOA is six years, with some exceptions. The parties may
agree, however, to reduce the statute of limitations to two
years. 4°6 Under California law, the maximum statute of limi-
tations for patent defects is four years. 47 For latent defects it
is ten years. Shorter statutes may apply when the associa-
tion was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of the
defect.48 Thus, UCIOA provides the consumer greater pro-
tection in some respects, in others less.
B. Director and Officer Liability
UCIOA provides that board members, not appointed by
the declarant, must exercise the degree of care and loyalty
required by the directors and officers of a corporation pursu-
ant to local law.409 It does not provide for immunity for direc-
tors who perform their duties in good faith.
Davis-Stirling, on the other hand, provides that volun-
teer officers and directors who serve in exclusively residential
developments, shall not be personally liable for actions while
404. See THOMAS E. MILLER, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITI-
GATION ch. 4 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
405. See CURTIS SPROUL & KATHARINE ROSENBERRY, ADvISING CALIFORNIA
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS § 11.13 (Continuing Educ. of
the Bar eds., 1994 & Supp. 1998).
406. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 4-116 (1994), 7 pt. 1 U.L.A.
588 (1997).
407. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
408. Id. § 337.15.
409. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 575 (1997).
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serving on the board of an exclusively residential develop-
ment, if the following conditions are met: (1) the director or
officer was acting within the scope of his or her association
duties; (2) the act was performed in good faith and was not
willful, wanton or grossly negligent; and (3) the association
maintained at the time of the claim of injury general liability,
and director and officer liability insurance coverage in the
amount of at least $500,000 if the development consists of
100 or fewer separate interests and $1,000,000 if the devel-
oper consists of more than 100 separate interests.41 ° There-
fore, Davis-Stirling provides more protection for directors and
officers than does UCIOA.
C. Owners'Liability
UCIOA provides that, "[a] unit owner is not liable, solely
by reason of being a unit owner for an injury or damages
arising out of the condition or use of the common elements."411
It further provides that, "[a]n action alleging a wrong done by
the association, including an action arising out of the condi-
tion or use of the common elements, may be maintained only
against the association and not against any unit owner."4
12
Under UCIOA, only the declarant is liable for the declar-
ant's torts in connection with any of the common interest
community that the declarant is obligated to maintain. 1 3
Further, if an alleged wrong occurred while the declarant
was in control, and the association gives the declarant notice
of a suit arising from such wrong and an opportunity to de-
fend, the declarant is liable to the association or any unit
owner for all tort losses not covered by insurance. This in-
cludes the association's attorneys fees and costs of litiga-
tion.4
Under California common law, individuals owning prop-
erty as tenants-in-common are jointly and severally liable for
injuries occurring on the premises."5  Accordingly, each
owner can be liable for the entire judgment, not just his or
410. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1365.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
411. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-111(a) (1994), 7 pt. 1
U.L.A. 589 (1997).
412. Id. § 3-111(b), at 589.
413. Id. § 3-111(a), at 589.
414. Id.
415. Ruoff v. Harbor Creek Community Ass'n, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App.
1992).
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her proportional share. Prior to the enactment section 1365.9
of the California Civil Code,416 this law applied to common in-
terest developments in which owners owned the common
area.
In Davert v. Larson,417 a motorist and passenger brought
an action against an individual, who owned a 1/2500 undi-
vided interest in a ranch and recreational community, for
injuries sustained when a horse which escaped from the
community collided with their car.1" The court held that
even though the association was obligated to maintain the
recreational community, the owners who owned the commu-
nity as tenants-in-common were liable for damages caused by
negligent maintenance."' The court further held that an
owner of only a 1/2500 interest in the community could be
sued for the entire amount of damages. 20
This holding was followed in Ruoff v Harbor Creek Com-
munity Ass'n421-a case in which an elderly guest of an owner
fell down a flight of stairs in the common area of a condo-
minium complex. The stairs were part of the common area,
owned by the unit owners as tenants-in-common, and the as-
sociation had the obligation to maintain the common area.""
Although the association maintained insurance, the plaintiffs
were concerned that the insurance was not sufficient to cover
the injuries and, therefore, also sued the owners as individu-
als.423 Consistent with established common law, the court in
Ruoff held that the owners could be held jointly and indi-
vidually liable for the injuries.424
Attorneys responded to the Ruoff decision by recom-
mending that those who owned common area as tenants-in-
common, in condominiums and planned development, trans-
fer all of the common area except a small portion to the asso-
ciation. In order to satisfy the statutory definition of condo-
minium, it is necessary for some of the common area to be
owned as tenants-in-common. Some developers, however,
416. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365.9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
417. 209 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1985).
418. Id. at 446.
419. Id. at 448.
420. Id. at 447.
421. 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 1992).
422. Id. at 758.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 760.
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have created condominiums where the area held as tenants
in common was only a small portion of airspace.
The legislature also responded to the problem by adding,
and later amending, section 1365.9 of the California Civil
Code. While patterned after UCIOA, this section specifies
particular insurance requirements.42 Section 1365.9 provides
that:
Any cause of action in tort against any owner of a separate
interest arising solely by reason of an ownership interest
as a tenant in common in the common area of a common
interest development shall be brought only against the as-
sociation and not against the owners of the separate inter-
4281ests,
provided the association has in effect for the cause of action
at least $2,000,000 in general liability insurance coverage
and the condominium consists of 100 or fewer separate
interests and $3,000,000 when it consists of more than 100
separate interests.
Section 1365.9 limits only the liability exposure of indi-
vidual unit owners; it does not provide complete immunity
from tort liability covered by the statute.2 7 If a judgment ex-
ceeds the policy limits specified in the statute, the question
of whether the association has an obligation to levy an as-
sessment against each owner to pay for the uninsured loss it
is still unanswered.
VII. ToPIcs NOT COVERED BY UCIOA
This article has discussed most of the major topics cov-
ered by UCIOA. If the legislature were to consider adopting
UCIOA, it would have to consider the topics which are cov-
ered by Davis-Stirling, but not UCIOA, to determine if these
should be included in a comprehensive act. For example,
Davis-Stirling has an Open Meeting Act,428 procedures for
paying assessments under protest,4 detailed procedures for
disputing liability for construction defects 40 rules regarding
425. See discussion supra Part VI. While UCIOA has insurance require-
ments it does not specify particular amounts in connection with the liability of
either the directors and officers or units owners.
426. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365.9 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
427. Id.
428. Id. § 1363.05.
429. Id. § 1366.3.
430. Id. § 1375.
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access to telephone wiring,43' and rules regarding funds re-
ceived by managing agents.432
Several of the provisions that are covered in Davis-
Stirling, and not UCIOA, are piecemeal legislation. A legis-
lator introduced the bill to solve the problems identified by a
single constituent or interest group, rather than to solve a
widespread problem. Therefore, if the legislature considers
adopting a version of UCIOA, it should carefully evaluate
whether each of the provision in Davis-Stirling, not covered
by UCIOA, is necessary.
CONCLUSION
California community association law is in a constant
state of flux. In some instances, it is extremely confusing.
Thus, a significant problem exists for volunteer officer and
directors, who are required to follow the law while managing
common interest communities. It also presents problems for
owners who can not determine what rights they have.
Adopting a version of UCIOA may provide a solution to
this problem because the California legislature is less likely
to amend a uniform act than it is to amend Davis-Stirling.
Since 1987, the California version of the Uniform Commercial
Code has only been amended twelve times, even though it
contains 11,004 sections, whereas Davis-Stirling, with only
twenty-seven sections, has been amended thirty-nine times.
In addition to stability, UCIOA may also provide benefits
to developers and people who own interests in common inter-
est developments. For example, if the legislature adopted
UCIOA as part of Davis-Stirling, small projects would be ex-
empt, and developers would have the ability to exempt com-
mercial and industrial developments.
Also, in the appropriate circumstances, owners would
have the ability to alter boundaries within their separate in-
terests, between their separate interests, and between com-
mon area and exclusive use common areas. It would be clear
that where appropriate, common areas could be sold with less
than unanimous consent. The courts would know how to dis-
tribute proceeds in a foreclosure sale involving common area,
eminent domain proceedings, and bankruptcy proceedings.
431. Id. § 1364.
432. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1363.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
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Those buying from a declarant in a foreclosure sale would
know precisely which of the declarants' rights they were pur-
chasing.
It would be easier for boards of directors to manage asso-
ciations. For example, associations would have the same
power as landlords in taking action against tenants who vio-
late covenants. In a foreclosure sale, the association could
collect up to six months of delinquent assessments. Insur-
ance requirements also would be clearer. The association
could decide whether to use arbitration and mediation prior
to filing a lawsuit.
On the other hand, in some instances existing California
law provides more benefits to developers and owners than
does UCIOA. For example, under California law, developers
have greater flexibility in annexing property to the initial de-
velopment, and it is easier for owners to amend the governing
documents.
Whether the provisions relating to liability are better
under UCIOA, depends on one's frame of reference. On the
one hand, developers are held to a higher fiduciary standard
under UCIOA. On the other hand, however, the Act does not
recognize strict liability for construction defects. Regardless
of one's perspective UCIOA does provide one significant bene-
fit. It is much easier to understand because it does not at-
tempt to micro manage disputes.
In effect, because existing California law provides some
benefits that UCIOA does not, UCIOA should not be adopted
uncritically. On the other hand, existing California law re-
lating to common interest developments is confusing, unnec-
essarily micro manages these developments, and contains
provisions that make the operation of these developments
more expensive than necessary. Further, the law constantly
changes. These problems force owners to incur unnecessary
expenses in hiring lawyers to interpret the constantly
changing law. Adopting a modified version of UCIOA should
help solve these problems. Thus, the legislature should con-
duct a comprehensive review of the law in this field and en-
act comprehensive legislation that does not constantly
change.
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